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Abstract
The thesis contains three chapters. The first chapter reports on the first large-scale
randomized field experiment involving legally-recognized minorities to examine the
causal effects of providing performance-based financial incentives based on social or
income disadvantage on high stakes university test scores. The results are that the
average test scores of the whole cohort goes down by .14 standard deviations when
financial incentives were provided by income disadvantage while there is no effect
on the test scores when financial incentives were provided by social disadvantage or
when financial incentives were provided to all students. The chapter provides evi-
dence of academic non-cooperation when financial incentives are offered by income
status and no evidence of such peer effects when prize incentives are given by social
disadvantage.
The second chapter, which is a joint work with Dr. H.F.Tam, studies the impact
of matrimonial laws introduced by the British in British provinces in colonial India
during 1800s and early 1900s. Exploiting quasi-random variations of districts that
were former British Provinces within each post-independent Indian states, we find
that females have 5% lower chances of marrying under the current legal age, and
1.6% higher chance of attending school at 10-16 years old in regions that were
formerly British Provinces. Furthermore, using historical Census of India 1901-1931
on marriage status of population between 0-15 years at district level, the chapter
estimates the impact of Child Marriage abolition Act (1931) on child marriages in
colonial India.
The third chapter uses a large-scale novel panel dataset (2005-14) on schools
from the Indian state of Assam to test for the impact of violent conflict on female
student’s enrolment ratios. We find that a doubling of average killings in a district-
year leads to a 13 per cent drop in girl’s enrolment rate with school fixed effects.
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Chapter 1
Field Study of Preferential
Incentives
This paper reports on the first large-scale randomized field experiment (14,190 un-
dergraduate students) involving legally-recognized minorities to examine the causal
effects of providing performance based financial incentives to disadvantaged students
on high stakes university test scores. Two definitions of being disadvantaged are ex-
amined separately: 1) income disadvantage, and 2) social disadvantage of belonging
to minority groups, i.e., the lower caste groups. The paper aims to measure the im-
pact of two types of affirmative action policies on the disadvantaged groups that the
policies target and on the excluded relatively advantaged peers. When only poor stu-
dents were given the opportunity to win the prize incentives, the average test scores
of the whole cohort decreased by .14 standard deviations. There is also a negative
spillover effect on the test scores of the nonpoor peers who are excluded from the
opportunity to win the prize incentives. Mechanisms of academic non-co-operation
as a response to preferential policies are tested. The paper provides evidence of social
tension and consequent non-cooperation among peers when only poor students are
incentivized and the majority of the peers, who happen not to be poor, are excluded.
1.1 Introduction
According to the All India Survey on Higher Education (2011-2012), 48.3% of all
students enrolled in higher education in India come from a historically discriminated
minority background, i.e., lower-caste groups. Lower castes are the legally recognized
minorities in India which include Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and
1
Other Backward Caste (OBC) groups.1 Despite high enrolment rate of lower caste
students in Indian universities, there exists a persistent educational attainment gap
between the lower caste and upper caste students, comparable to the black and
white student achievement gap in the U.S (Desai and Kulkarni (2008)).
In light of the above problem, common solutions sought by the policymakers in
India are affirmative action policies which aim to provide incentives for students
from disadvantaged economic and social backgrounds. These schemes are merit
cum means scholarship schemes, which are provided in most universities in India
and are presented in the form of tournament incentives among disadvantaged stu-
dents. Tournament incentives are schemes where prizes are awarded on the basis of
relative performance of the students, for example, a prize for the highest scorer in an
exam is a tournament incentive scheme. Merit cum means schemes are tournament
prize schemes where students from disadvantaged background compete only among
themselves for a prize. Disadvantage is variously defined by the policymakers. Some
schemes are given by income status where poor students from both minority and
non-minority background compete and some schemes are given by minority sta-
tus, i.e., lower caste status, where the lower caste students from both low and high
income households compete.
As of 2009, the Indian Government introduced national merit cum means schol-
arships, each worth about USD 152 per year for roughly three years, to be provided
to 82,000 undergraduate students from disadvantaged backgrounds. The objective
on the part of the government for introducing such tournament incentives is to use
limited government resources for selecting and providing financial assistance to the
ablest candidates among disadvantaged groups: “To promote qualitative education
amongst SC students, by providing full financial support for pursuing studies beyond
12th class (...). The general selection criteria among the eligible candidates of any
institution must be the merit.(Ministry of Justice and Social Empowerment, 2017)”
Besides, the motivation provided by the policy makers, there is an economic argu-
ment for the need to incentivize students from weaker socio-economic groups. The
economic justification for providing incentives to disadvantaged groups is that mar-
ket frictions (such as perceived low returns to education and discrimination) beyond
liquidity constraints are known to affect human capital investment as well as the
labor market outcomes of discriminated social and economic groups in developing
countries (Attanasio et al. (2011); Carneiro et al. (2011); Jensen (2010); Banerjee
1According to Census of India, 2011, 16.6% of the population are Scheduled Castes, and 8.6%
of the population are Scheduled Tribes.
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et al. (2007); Hanna and Linden (2012)). Therefore, it is possible that students who
are financially disadvantaged or students who are socially disadvantaged or students
who are handicapped both socially and economically are not optimally investing in
education. While there is an economic motivation to incentivize students from dis-
advantaged backgrounds, little is known about how the beneficiaries and the non
beneficiaries respond to such incentives and how it impacts their test scores.
This chapter examines the effectiveness of the above merit cum means tour-
nament scholarship schemes, which are implemented nationwide to provide a level
playing field to the poor or historically discriminated minorities. Two definitions of
being disadvantaged are examined: 1) financial disadvantage 2) social disadvantage
of belonging to minority groups, i.e., the lower caste groups. We incentivize the
poor students from all social backgrounds to explore the incentive effects of tourna-
ments on the financially disadvantaged students. To examine the impacts on socially
disadvantaged, we incentivize the lower caste groups from all income background.
The novel contribution of the paper is that it provides evidence on the impact of
preferential policies on the excluded advantaged social groups in an environment
where both advantaged and disadvantaged social groups work together. Since most
affirmative action policies are implemented in contexts of tournaments, our findings
on the effectiveness of merit cum means tournament incentives could potentially
be relevant for many other affirmative action policies (Hickman (2013); Calsamiglia
et al. (2013); Sheremeta (2015); Fryer and Loury (2005)).
To investigate the impact of the merit cum means scholarship policy, in this
paper the author implemented a large-scale randomized field experiment involving
more than 14,000 students, where prize incentives for the poor, the lower caste
groups i.e, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Castes, and
prize incentives for all were randomized across 470 cohorts in Indian universities.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to randomize actual government
affirmative action policy, involving legally recognized minorities. From now on we
will refer to the prize incentives for all as untargeted schemes, prize incentives for the
poor as income or economically targeted schemes and prize incentives for the lower
castes as socially targeted schemes. Under untargeted tournaments, students from
all backgrounds compete. Under income targeted tournaments, upper and lower
caste students from low income households compete and under socially targeted
tournaments, rich and poor lower caste students compete for the prizes.
The tournament incentives in the experiment were given out on the basis of the
performance in high stakes university exams. Our treatments change both the size
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and the demographic composition of the contests. The incentives that were tested
included untargeted incentives (i.e., prize incentives for all), where two financial
rewards were given to students in a cohort. The first monetary prize of USD 62
was awarded to the student with the highest grade point average (GPA) in the
cohort, and the second monetary award of USD 54 went to the student in the top
40% with the highest GPA improvement in the cohort. On average, a cohort had
about 50 students. Thus, when prize incentives were provided for all, on average
50 students competed for the two monetary prizes. The second treatment arm was
socially-targeted incentives (i.e., prize incentives only for the lower castes), where
the same two financial incentives were only given to the lower caste students within
a cohort: the first to the highest scorer from the lower castes in the cohort, and the
second to the student who was in the top 40% among the lower caste students in
the cohort and who showed the highest improvement in scores when compared with
previous university test scores. On average, 50% of the students within a cohort
belong to the lower caste groups. Thus, when prize incentives for only the lower
castes were provided, 25 students on average competed with each other for the two
prizes. The third treatment was income targeting (i.e. prize incentives only for the
poor), where the same two financial incentives were given to students with an annual
family income of USD 2,340 or less. Approximately 10% of all students within a
cohort were students with an annual family income of USD 2,340 or less. Therefore,
when prize incentives are provided only for the poor, on average, only 5 students,
competed for the two prizes. The control group comprised of students in cohorts
with no incentives.
In order to capture the effects of targeting (i.e., providing incentives only to the
lower castes or only to the poor students) on non-beneficiary peers, incentives were
randomized across cohorts, where a cohort was defined as an entire group of students
studying the same degree, in the same degree year, and at the same college (e.g.
the entire first year of undergraduate students studying economics at a particular
educational institution is a cohort). The spillover effects on non-beneficiaries were
estimated by comparing the means of the advantaged students in a cohort whose
disadvantaged peers were incentivized with advantaged students in a cohort whose
disadvantaged classmates were not incentivized.
Tournament incentives are known to generate high powered incentives for ex-
erting effort among participants, particularly if contestants have similar abilities
and socio-economic backgrounds (Sheremeta (2015)). However, such incentives can
result in unintended impacts on non-beneficiaries. The psychological literature on
4
affirmative action policies presents evidence of a backlash by non-beneficiaries, who
may feel unfairly excluded by affirmative action policies (Shteynberg et al. (2011);
Harrison et al. (2006); Lynch (1989)).
Our paper provides the first causal evidence of a negative impact of targeted
tournament incentives. It also provides first evidence of negative spillover effects
on the peers within the cohort who were excluded from the opportunity to win the
prize incentives. Surprisingly, the negative effects were statistically and econom-
ically significant only in income targeted tournaments, where poor students were
provided with monetary incentives. Under income targeted tournaments, 10% of
the cohort became eligible to compete for the monetary incentives. The mean dete-
rioration in scores in entire cohorts where only poor students were incentivized was
.14 standard deviation (SDs) of student performance, compared to the cohort with
no incentives. Socially-targeted incentives, i.e., prize incentives only for the lower
castes, incentivized, on average, 50% of the cohort and produced no average effect
on test scores, as was the case for untargeted pure merit tournaments. In Kremer
et al. (2009), tournament incentives for girls increased test scores of girls by .19 SDs
and also increased the performance of boys. However, the study indicates that the
attendance of teachers improved due to school-based student incentives, which can
potentially explain the positive spillover on boys. In our case of student incentives,
institutional channels were not present, due to a high rate of student absenteeism
and poor quality teaching. The parameter that was relevant in our setting was peer
interaction among colleagues, which was probably less salient among primary school
students in incentivized Kenyan schools. In Bertrand et al. (2010), there is sugges-
tive evidence of a negative impact of affirmative action policies on the labor market
outcomes of non-beneficiaries, but the limited sample size prevented the authors
from drawing such conclusions.
We investigated whether non-beneficiary peers disapprove of preferential incen-
tives. Non-beneficiaries may find it unfair to be excluded from a prize competition,
and they may become upset and demotivated and refuse to cooperate with weaker
students who are included in the tournament. The demotivation effect of being
excluded from an opportunity can negatively impact on their test scores, while
non-cooperation with low ability students who are given an opportunity can affect
the performance of disadvantaged students, who, on average, have very low test
scores and who are likely not to be familiar with the education production function
(Hanushek et al. (2008); Krueger (1999)).
An attitude survey administered post-announcement of prize incentives and prior
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to university exams delivers evidence of tensions among cohorts that had income-
targeted tournaments. We further investigated whether resourceful and close friend-
ship ties, which are unlikely to dissolve due to one-time incentives, could have a ben-
eficial effect on academically-weak students. Using pre-intervention network data,
we find that low ability students who sorted themselves into friendship networks
with high ability students prior to our intervention experienced a positive effect on
test scores under income-targeted incentives. This suggests that the friendship net-
works of disadvantaged groups can potentially play a role in targeted incentives. To
investigate further whether friendship networks play a role because colleagues who
are not close friends refuse to cooperate, we analyzed post-intervention network data
collected from a sub-sample. We provide evidence that income targeting caused poor
students to seek support from their closest friends who are also low ability students
like themselves. However, since the response rate of the post-intervention network
data was very low, the results on changing peer interaction should be interpreted
with caution.
This paper has several implications for policy. The most striking finding in our
paper is that the academic performance of students excluded from the tournament
competition significantly decreased relative to no tournaments. More importantly,
the targeted incentive, which excluded the largest proportion of students, had the
largest negative effect. This result has important implications for affirmative policies
in weak institutions. In developing economies, where institutions are weak, policies
that are designed to aid highly disadvantaged groups will exclude large sections of
resourceful social groups, who may find such policies unfair (Patilder Reservation
Agitation, 2017; Jat Quota Protests, 2017; Anti-Reservation Student Protests, 2006)
and therefore refuse to cooperate with weaker demographic groups. This can have
a potentially a negative impact on the output of all social groups.
We further find evidence that students with resourceful friends respond posi-
tively to incentives. This implies that the negative effect of preferential policies can
potentially be mitigated by institutional support. This paper provides support for
examining the role of institutional support in neutralizing the disincentive effects of
incentive schemes designed to help the needy.
The negative effects on performance as a result of economic targeting are not
in line with the empirical findings in the literature on performance-based incentives
(Burgess et al. (2016); Fryer Jr et al. (2015); Levitt et al. (2011); Kremer et al.
(2009), Angrist et al. (2009); Glewwe and Kremer (2006); Van der Klaauw (2002);
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Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988)). It may be that negative peer effect parameters did
not operate in the contexts in which previous studies were conducted.
This paper relates to the literature on experimental economics, that tests the
link between affirmative action policies and effort and performance. Examples in-
clude Schotter and Weigelt (1992), where asymmetry was exogenously imposed by
researchers assigning cost functions to subjects, and Bracha et al. (2015), who fo-
cused on gender-based asymmetry in quantitative problem solving. Calsamiglia et al.
(2013) conducted a field experiment in which 10 to 13 year old children competed
Sudoku puzzles in a pair-wise (one-to-one) tournament, with asymmetry stemming
from previous exposure to Sudoku. Hickman (2013) created disadvantaged groups by
making school children from different grades compete with each other, with school
children from lower grades being viewed as the disadvantaged group. Our paper
makes a step forward by examining the incentive effects of affirmative action poli-
cies by randomizing preferential treatments over legally recognized, discriminated
against minorities. In the real world, disadvantaged groups can experience severe
resource constraints when compared to non-minorities. Additionally, the minority
groups may also have nonminority friends or colleagues. Pro-minority policies may
antagonize nonminority colleagues. By involving minorities in the experiment, the
current study complements the above literature by capturing the actual constraints
that could impact the outcome of the minorities. This can also help explain why the
results of the current paper differ from the experiments noted above, which found
positive effects on the performance of disadvantaged groups
The paper makes a unique contribution to the literature concerning tournaments
(Sheremeta (2015)). We find that tournament incentives can affect on the outcomes
of individuals who are excluded from opportunities to compete and be recognized for
their performance. This is particularly relevant in the setting of equal opportunity
laws, which primarily arise in the form of tournaments where weaker social groups
have a handicap.
The work also contributes to the literature on peer effects in education (Burns
et al. (2015); Lavy and Sand (2016); Lavy et al. (2012); Carrell et al. (2009); Hoxby
(2000); Sacerdote (2001)). The literature on peer effects have shown that social
interactions among peers matter for academic performance. Our paper contributes
to the literature by examining the causal impact of financial incentives on test scores,
given that peer effects are at work.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the experi-
ment details and the data, while Section 4 describes the model. Section 5 outlines the
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estimation strategy, Section 6 presents the main findings, and Section 7 summaries
the heterogeneous effects of income targeting. Section 8 reviews the robustness
checks and Section 9 concludes the paper.
1.2 Background and Field Experiment Details
The experiment was conducted in the states of Assam and Meghalaya. Assam is an
extremely poor state with a state GDP of approx. USD 781 (Directorate of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, Government of Assam, 2016) and 32% of the population below
the poverty line (Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region, Government of
India, 2011-2012), relative to the national average of 22%. In Meghalaya, 16% of
the population are below the poverty line (Ministry of Development of North East-
ern Region, Government of India, 2011-2012). The gross enrolment ratios in higher
education in Assam and Meghalaya are 12.8 and 17.3, respectively (NITI Aayog,
2011-2012) compared to the national average of 24.3 (NITI Aayog, 2011-2012).
The experiment was conducted in collegiate universities. Most of the state and
central government universities in India are collegiate universities. A collegiate uni-
versity is a university in which the governing authority and functions are divided
between a central administration and various constituent colleges. The constituent
colleges are not merely halls of residences but have their own management, student
unions, and academic faculties, and they require different cut-off scores for admis-
sions. All students in the colleges take centralized university exams every six months,
which are marked anonymously by external examiners organized by the university.
The mark sheets and degrees are awarded by the university. There are about 760
universities in India, with almost 40,000 affiliated colleges. Each university has, on
average, about 200 to 560 affiliated colleges. In India, about 42% of the universities
are either central universities or state public universities (AISHE Report, Ministry
of Human Resources, 2016). Assam has a total of six state and central government
universities, of which four are included in this study’s sample. In Meghalaya, there
are five universities in total, of which the largest university is included in the sample.
All public colleges in India are legally required to implement affirmative action
policies in the form of caste reservation quotas. Since 1950, the Indian constitution
prohibits discrimination based on caste and has put affirmative action measures in
place to protect members of disadvantaged groups, such as Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes. In 1990, provisions were made to include Other Backward Castes
(OBCs) in the caste-based reservation system. Reservation is a form of quota-based
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affirmative action governed by constitutional and statutory laws, as well as by local
rules and regulations. The quota system sets aside a proportion of all possible
positions for members of a specific group. Those not belonging to the designated
communities can only compete for the remaining positions, while members of the
designated communities can compete for all positions (both reserved and open).
Enrolment in colleges and universities and vacancies in public institutions have a
total of 49.5% constitutional reservations. Meghalaya, being a tribal minority state,
has reservations totaling approximately 90% for tribal minorities.
The public higher-education institutions in India are highly subsidized, are of
high quality, and have almost no tuition fees; however, supply is limited and com-
petition for admissions into public collegiate universities is extremely high. Entry
into higher educational institutions in India is based solely on the test scores of
standardized school-leaving exams. Students belonging to lower castes are given
preference in college admissions by having lower cut-off entry score requirements.
The difference in cut-off scores for admission between those given preferences and
the upper castes is substantial (Krishna and Tarasov (2016); Bertrand et al. (2010)).
One key feature of the research design is that only students who study major
subjects were considered for the experiment. Students who have majors take a fixed
set of compulsory exams, which is common for all students studying that major. The
classification of a degree for a major student is determined by their performance in
the university exams for their major subject. The students studying the same major
in the same degree year spend many lecture hours together in college because they
take a common set of courses.
1.2.1 Randomization
To begin the field experiment, the standard protocol was followed. Firstly, permis-
sion for the experiment was secured from the university vice chancellors and college
principals in the States of Assam and Meghalaya. A list of 11 public colleges were
randomly selected using a random number generator from a list of over 40 colleges,
where permission was granted, and that were in the town of Shillong, Hailakandi
and Guwahati, where the author had accommodation.
The experiment included 14,190 college undergraduate students in all years.
There were 10 non-engineering colleges and 1 engineering college.
All non engineering colleges have on average two faculties: faculties of arts,
faculty of science. Arts and sciences faculties on average are subdivided into 8-9
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departments for example, faculty of arts has department of sociology, department
of political science and so on and faculty of science has department of physics,
department of chemistry and so on. Each department of all non-engineering colleges
has 3 cohorts: 1st year students, 2nd year students and 3rd year students.
The engineering college is divided into 10 faculties. The faculties in the engineer-
ing college are not subdivided into departments. Each faculty has 4 cohorts such as
1st year students, 2nd year students, 3rd year students, 4th year students.
Our unit of randomization was a cohort of students enrolled on degree D un-
der faculty f studying in the year t in college C at university U . For example,
a class of students studying history major during their first year of a degree pro-
gram at St Johns College, which is affiliated with the University of U , is our unit of
randomization.
Simple stratified random sampling was used to randomize the treatment incen-
tives. The sample was stratified by the following covariates (wherever possible): i)
university ii) college iii) faculty, such as faculty of arts or faculty of sciences iv)
degree year of study.2 To avoid potential inference problems stemming from the
way the sample was stratified, we will do our analysis using randomization inference
test that is robust to the problem of computing correct clustered robust standard
errors. Additionally, we will divide our sample by colleges that were stratified sim-
ilarly (e.g. by dropping engineering college) and test the significance of our results
using different levels of clustering and report the clustered robust standard errors.
Within each strata, cohorts were randomized into three treatments and control
groups using random number generators. A fixed rule of having equal proportion
of treatment units in every strata was implemented. Each strata of non engineering
colleges had on average of about 8-9 departments. Students were compared across
departments but within the same degree year and within the same faculty and
within the same college. Most of the non engineering colleges have arts and science
faculties. Some non engineering colleges have arts, science and commerce faculties.
Some non engineering colleges have only arts faculty. Two non engineering colleges
have only first and second year students. In total, non engineering colleges make
2The engineering college could not be further stratified at degree year level because the faculties
were not subdivided into departments to enable stratification by degree year. In engineering college,
faculty and departments are synonymous. Due to potential inference problem that might arise due
to the inclusion of this college, we will show our analysis are robust after entirely dropping the
engineering college from the analysis. We will further do the randomization inference test analysis
which is a method that is robust to inference issues related to stratification designs, cluster size
and strata size.
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up 49 strata which includes 430 cohorts. Non engineering college have on average
(approximately) 5 strata per college. Engineering college make up 10 strata, with
each strata having 4 cohorts, which adds up to 40 cohorts. We have in total 470
cohorts divided into 59 strata.
Fig. 1.10.1 displays an example of stratification in a college that has both arts
and science faculties. The figure shows how the treatments were randomized within
arts and science departments for every degree year of study.
In our design, we have 49 strata with between 8-9 cohorts in each stratum, on
average. Each of the 49 strata will have 8 or 9 cohorts to assign to treatments. The
remaining 10 strata will have 4 cohorts to assign into treatments in each of the strata.
To think about variation in treatment assignment that determines the power of the
experiment, one needs to think about how many possible ways treatments can be
assigned (Fisher (1937)). For 49 strata, each stratum had on average about 8 cohorts
to randomize into 3 treatments and 1 control group. Within each stratum, one has
to compute the possible combinations of treatment assignment, where each group
will consist of two cohorts. This is 2520 for each stratum. So, in total 49 strata,
there are 123480 possible ways of assigning treatments. For each of the remaining
10 strata, there are only 4 cohorts to be assigned to 4 treatments. This amounts to
additional 240 possible ways of assigning treatments. In total, the variations in the
treatment variable are 123,720.
Ideally, to increase power, one would like to stratify the sample on the basis of
variables that predict test scores such as baseline test scores, the proportion of poor
students, etc. Due to unavailability of data at the design stage, no pre-treatment
analysis was possible. Moreover, the spillover effects on the non-incentivised students
found in the experiment could not be predicted beforehand. This is because the
literature on the theories of tournaments does not make any predictions on the
non-contestants of the tournament. More importantly, we could not predict that
the proportion of poor students whose annual family income would be USD 2,340
and below would be as low as about 10 percent on average among cohorts where
administrative data on income were collected by the colleges before the intervention.
Therefore any pre-treatment analysis of spillover effects was not possible.
We have 106 cohorts in each treatment arm and 152 cohorts in the control
groups. The treatment group with untargeted financial incentives is comprised of
3,298 students, the group with a caste-based treatment has 3,369 students, and the
group with income-based treatment has 3,114 students. The control group has 4,409
students.
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Our randomization implies that students studying in the same university, in the
same college, in the same faculty and in the same year of their degree are compared.
This further implies that sociology major students in their freshman year studying
in college C, affiliated to university U , and treated with incentives are compared
to history major students in their freshman year studying in college C, affiliated
to university U , who are in the control group, because both fall under the faculty
of humanities. But our randomization allows for the possibility that if a sociology
major student in the freshman year in college C affiliated to university U is treated
with incentives, it may happen that a sociology major student in freshman year
in college K affiliated to the same university U is in the control group. Table A1
provides a balance check as to whether subjects jointly predict treatments. There
are 47 subjects in total.3.
Since colleges affiliated to university U are different in terms of management
practices, quality of faculty, and quality of admitted students, it was not possible
to compare economic major students studying in college C with economics major
students studying in college K, even if both colleges are affiliated to university U .
Due to a lack of credible measures to quantify the differences among colleges and
due to the availability of few colleges, it was not possible to group colleges in the
stratification along characteristics, and then stratify by subjects within the pooled
colleges.
An alternative method of randomization is to perform a comparison between
the students studying the same major, who are in the same year of their degree
and at the same college. However, this would imply randomization among students
studying at the same college and taking the same major exams. This would cause
spillovers in study partnerships, violating our identifying assumptions to measure
the spillover effects of incentives.
Our stratification can have problems of identification. To deal with the problem
3One concern about our randomization is that we are comparing students who have selected
to major in different subjects. Two factors are important to note: 1) admissions into a specific
degree course is not entirely driven by the choice of the candidate. Admission is dependent on the
candidate’s school leaving exam scores and the cut-off scores required by a college department. If
we observe a student studying physics, it does not imply that this subject was her first choice;
and 2) during the pre-college education years (e.g. high school studies) students may choose to
study arts, science and commerce courses. Students who select arts and commerce courses in
their pre-college years cannot then study any science or engineering subjects at college. Arts
and commerce students are restricted to choices in arts subjects and their final degree partially
depends on their choice of subject and the ongoing cut-off scores of the colleges. Thus, stratifying
candidates between arts and science and engineering degrees is likely to induce a balance along the
unobservable that is correlated with subject preferences.
12
of identification, in this section we provide balance tests of key observables. Later,
while describing the estimation strategy we will explain how our design solves key
issues such as teacher bias in grading test scores and grading on a curve problem.
Table 1.11.1 provides a balance test of covariates, that includes pre-intervention uni-
versity test scores, of the full sample of 11 colleges using regression specification with
treatments and stratifying dummies (Duflo et al. (2007)). The standard deviation of
each of the covariates are also specified for each of the treatment and control groups.
Additionally, we report in Table B1 a placebo check where we examine treatment
effects on university test scores before our intervention. Since freshman year stu-
dents did not take any university exams by then, we only report pre-intervention
university test scores of the students of higher years (such as second year students,
third year students, so on). We find no effect on the pre-intervention university test
scores of the students. In column (2), we report treatment effects on the university
test scores of the same students after our intervention. We find a negative treat-
ment effect of income targeting on post-intervention test scores. Furthermore, we
use randomisation inference test to solve the issues of identification. Randomisation
inference is robust to outliers (Young (2015)). Therefore, any imbalance between
the treated and control groups would not bias the results.
The way we stratified our sample could also lead to problems of statistical infer-
ence. We use both conventional econometrics and randomization inference methods
to establish our results.
Assuming 470 clusters are sufficiently many, conventional econometrics suggests
that clustered treatment assignment can be accounted for using cluster robust stan-
dard errors (Cameron and Miller (2015)). Similarly, the problems that stratification
can pose for estimation can be solved using strata fixed effects (Bruhn and McKen-
zie (2009); Duflo et al. (2007)). In the robustness check, we try to address potential
issues regarding inter cluster spatial correlations.
However, to remove all concerns about the correct specification of standard er-
rors that would lead to valid inference, we use Fisher’s randomization inference test
(Fisher (1937)) to estimate the treatment effect of incentives. Randomization Infer-
ence method tests the sharp null of no treatment effect i.e. the test which examines
whether the treatment was completely irrelevant.4 Fisherian randomized inference
4The sharp null hypothesis is particularly relevant for estimating the effect on the test scores
of the non incentivized students who were exposed to their peers receiving the incentives i.e. the
spillover effect. The non incentivized peers can be expected to have no effect on their test scores.
The sharp null of no effect on test scores is most relevant in this case.
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test is exact with a known distribution regardless of the sample size or the covari-
ance structure of the errors. It does not rely on the asymptotic properties of the
estimators. Problems with inference due to non standard techniques of stratification
or varying cluster size or strata size or outliers can be solved using randomisation
inference test (Young (2015)). In conventional econometric methods, the statisti-
cal distribution of the estimated treatment effects is assumed to be emerging from
the random draw of the disturbance and the regressor terms from a population
distribution. In contrast, in randomization inference the key thought experiment
is that, given the experimental sample, the only random element determining the
realization of outcomes is the randomized allocation of treatment. Indeed in RCTs,
the researcher randomizes the treatment which determines , if any , the differences
in outcomes. In RCTs, the researcher knows exactly how the randomization was
carried out, and randomization inference uses this information to assess whether
observed outcomes in a given sample are likely to have been observed by chance
even if treatment had no effect. To compute randomization inference p-values, we
only need to replicate the original random assignment method and determine the
distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis, through resampling. We
report p values of treatment effect coefficient of two randomization inference test:
1) randomization inference-c and 2) randomization inference-t using Alwyn Young’s
randcmd code (Young (2015)). Any randomization test is exact. The choice of test
statistic is based on power rather than on sample size. We will report results using
both methods for our key findings.
1.2.2 Treatment
The financial incentives were randomized across three-treatment arms. The first
treatment arm received untargeted incentives, in which all students studying the
same major, in the same year of their degree program, and at the same college
were considered for financial rewards. The second treatment arm received socially-
targeted incentives, for which only lower-caste students among a cohort of students
that study the same major, are in the same year of their degree, and are at the
same college were eligible for financial rewards. The third treatment arm received
economically-targeted financial incentives, in that students from households with an
average annual income of 150,000 rupees (approximately equivalent to USD 2,340 in
PPP terms) or less among a cohort of students studying the same major, in the same
year of their degree program, and at the same college were eligible for monetary
prizes. The control group consisted of the entire cohort of students studying the
same major, in the same year of their degree program, and at the same college who
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received no financial incentives.
There were two types of financial incentives in each of the treatment arms: 1)
one prize was for the student who scored the highest in the major subject among all
the classmates within the cohort; and 2) the second prize was for the student who
was in the top 40% of the cohort and had shown the highest improvement in scores
in the major subject, compared to their previous university exam scores in the same
subject. These two types of monetary prizes were administered to all treatment
groups. Under the lower-caste-based incentives, the student who scored the highest
among the lower castes within the cohort and the student in the top 40% percent
among the lower castes within the cohort who had shown the highest improvement in
scores compared to previous university exams were awarded prize money. Similarly,
under the income-based incentives, students from low-income backgrounds, defined
by an annual family income of USD 2,340 or less, competed only amongst themselves.
The highest scoring student among these poor students was awarded the prize, along
with the student who had shown the highest improvement in test scores and came
in the top 40% among the poor students in the cohort. Financial incentives were
only given to the major students according to their performance in major exams.
Students were automatically eligible for the incentives if they were enroled in
college. They did not have to apply for the incentives. All treatment groups and
control groups contained students from freshman years and from higher years. Stu-
dents from freshman years only had one prize per cohort because there were no
baseline university exams available for them to award the second incentive prize.
Students from higher years had two prizes per cohort.
Using the baseline survey, financial incentives in each city were awarded according
to one month’s rent for the students in the private sector. In the colleges in Assam,
the financial incentive was about USD 62 for the highest scorer and USD 54 for
the student showing the highest improvement in performance. In Meghalaya, the
financial incentive was 5,500 rupees (USD 84) for the highest scoring student and
5,000 rupees (USD 78) for the student that showed the highest improvement in
performance. This is because the cost of living in Meghalaya is higher. Nine out
of eleven colleges are from Assam and only two colleges are from Meghalaya. The
financial incentive given approximates to about 6-8% of state GDP per capita. The
colleges in the sample, on average, offer merit and merit-cum-means scholarships
of USD 11 annually for every department, such as the department of mathematics,
department of economics, etc. The monthly rent for college accommodation averages
out to approximately USD 23.
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Both caste- and income-based incentives were offered using administrative records
collected by the college at the time of student admission. Due to affirmative action
policies, all public colleges maintain detailed caste records of their students. Col-
leges maintain income records of those students whose parents’ annual incomes are
300,000 rupees (equivalent to USD 4,680) or less. However, the income records of
second- and third-year students were missing for ten colleges because they did not
maintain income records in previous years. Since colleges are not legally required to
maintain records of income, most colleges do not maintain student’s income records.
However, in 2016, the government of Assam urged colleges to maintain detailed
income records of poor students who are eligible for educational subsidies by the
government. Therefore, we obtained income records of freshman-year students from
most of the colleges. In severely resource-constrained colleges, most of these records
have been lost. In such colleges, the students were asked to submit government-
issued income certificates to the heads of their departments. However, this would
potentially cause endogeneity in this study’s treatment. Consequently, to examine
the spillover effects of income tournaments on test scores, we only examined the
sample for which administrative records were maintained before our intervention.
In each cohort, students who were eligible for prize incentives are called contes-
tants, and students who were ineligible but their colleagues within the cohort were
eligible are non-contestants who were exposed to the tournament treatment. We
estimated the average effect of the treatment by comparing the average means of
the test scores of the treated and the control cohorts. To estimate the effects on
groups that were directly incentivized, we compared the mean performance of the
incentivized groups in the treated and control cohorts. To estimate the spillover, we
compared the mean performance of the non-contestants in the treated cohort that
were exposed to the treatment with the non-contestants in the control cohort.
1.2.3 Timing
Fig. 1.10.2 summarizes the timeline of the experiment. In 2016, between July and
mid-September, a baseline survey was conducted in eight colleges across three cities.
The baseline survey consisted of data pertaining to the parent’s occupations, pref-
erences for quota policies, student friendship networks, and information on student
living expenses and monthly scholarships. For logistical reasons, the baseline survey
of the remaining three colleges could not be completed by mid-September. From the
end of September to the first week of October, students were informed about the
monetary rewards being given out. The information was provided by each college
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principal using a college notification and was also announced in class by the respec-
tive heads of departments. Students were also told that limited funding was available
and that the funding was allocated to departments using a lottery. Additionally,
we went to all the treatment and control groups and collected information, using
surveys, regarding their attitudes towards targeted funding and their perspectives
on winning untargeted and targeted monetary rewards.
The colleges remained closed from the second week of October until the first
week of November. The exams took place between mid-November to the first week
of December across eleven colleges from four universities. Another post-intervention
network survey was administered in january in one college. The exam results were
published between the end of December and the second week of March. The mone-
tary rewards were administered at each of the colleges when the exam results were




We used administrative data on university exam scores from the university database
as our primary outcome of interest. College degrees are graded based on performance
in the high-stakes university exams, and the test scores of university exams are used
to apply for both private and public-sector jobs after graduation. These test scores
are also required for entry into master’s programs after graduation.
The semester exams taken by the students determine the GPA scores of the
students, which range from 0 to 10. All students from each college in the sample
take one university exam each semester. Each university provides an aggregate GPA
score for the major subjects of each student, on a scale of 0 to 10. Two universities
did not provide GPAs on a scale of 0 to 10. Thus, we changed the score to a
percentage score and scaled it by 10.
The baseline scores of the students (i.e. the GPA of the students in previous
university exams taken before the intervention) were only available for those not
in their freshman year of study. Additionally, the baseline data from two colleges
both affiliated with the same university could not be retrieved due to administrative
changes in the post-experimental period. The total number of students for whom
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baseline scores were available is 6,643. The mean baseline scores were 6.05. Both
the proportion of students for whom baseline data was not available and the base-
line scores of students for whom the baseline test scores data were available were
balanced along the observables across the treatment and control groups, as reported
in Table 1.11.1. The pairwise tests across treatment groups are shown in Table A2.
The dropout rate of these high-stake university exams is about 8%, and these
students will need to repeat all their exams the following semester. The control
group has 397 of these students, the income-targeting treatment group has 259, the
caste-targeted incentive group has 292, and the untargeted incentives group contains
244. A randomization check is shown in Table 1.11.1 and Table A2, which highlights
that the treatment groups are neither pairwise nor jointly different from the control
group regarding dropout rates. Baseline data for students only in the higher years
of study is available. In the attrition sample, approximately 427 students are not
in their freshman year, from which only the baseline records of 235 students are
available. The mean of the baseline scores of the attrition students is 3.89, and the
scores range from 0 to 9. About 60% of students in the attrition sample belong
to lower castes; however, the attrition rates of both the lower and upper castes are
balanced across the treatment arms.
Data on Caste and Income
Every college maintains records on student’s castes using government-issued caste
certificates at the point of student admission. We used administrative data to iden-
tify caste. Data on castes was available for 11,226 out of 14,190 students using
college administrative records. Students whose caste data was not available were
treated as upper caste.
In contrast, data regarding income was only collected by a subsample of colleges.
Data on income was available for 6,542 students using administrative data. Poor
students who received prize money were identified using administrative data.
In colleges where income records were not maintained, the head teachers of each
department were asked to collect the income records of their students. Very few
records were collected by the head teachers. Some students directly submitted their
records to the research team. Poor students were identified from the income records
submitted either to the research team or to the head teachers before the exams took
place.
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To understand the spillover effects of income-treated cohorts on non-poor stu-
dents within the cohort, we only analyzed the subsample of colleges where adminis-
trative records were available with the colleges before the study’s intervention.
Table 1.11.1 shows the sample balance using only college administrative records.
Approximately 50% of the students on average in each cohort are from the lower
castes, and around 10% of the students on average in each cohort have an annual
family income of USD 2,340 dollars or less; thus, they are eligible for economic
targeting. Fig. 1.10.3 shows the distribution of baseline GPAs for upper and lower
castes, controlling for income. In our sample, the poor lower castes are .5 standard
deviation below poor upper castes, which is in contrast to the educational attainment
gap between black and white students, where black students score roughly 1 standard
deviation below white students on standardized tests.
1.3.2 Baseline Survey Data
A survey was administered in eight colleges before the intervention. The survey
collected information on whether the students received any scholarships and the
exact amounts they received in scholarships. The students were also asked to provide
the full names of three of their friends with whom they hang out and study after
lectures. For each named friend, the students self-reported the frequency of their
interactions. The question regarding the frequency of interaction was posed as a
scale ranging from seven days a week, two-to-six days a week, and one day a week.
Using a Likert scale, the survey also asked questions about how often they agreed
or disagreed with caste- or income-based quotas or no quota policies. The survey
was conducted towards the end of their lectures, with the help of the lecturer. The
survey was conducted for those present in class, among which the response rate was
100%.
It could be that the students who responded to the survey were different from
the entire sample. Therefore, to use the survey data to examine the possible mech-
anisms through which incentives work, we first needed to examine how different
the respondents were from the rest of the population and whether the respondents
differed across the various treatment arms. Data from the survey was merged with
the student university exam mark sheet using the full names of the students, their
department, the year of their degree program, and the class roll list. We were able
to identify 5,905 students (45% of the sample) out of approximately 9,000 survey
responses using administrative records. Students that have an identical full name or
study at the same college, in the same department, and in the same year could not be
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uniquely traced back to their exam mark sheet. Thus, these students were dropped
from the sample (there were only two cases). Most of the time, the handwriting
could not be read properly to be able to trace the names back to the student’s mark
sheets. Table A3 compares the statistics of students who took part in the survey
and whose names could be traced back to their mark sheet with students who either
did not do the survey or could not be linked to their exam mark sheet. Table A4
and Table A5 show the balance along the observables of the students across the
treatment arms of the survey respondents.
1.3.3 Baseline Network Data
Students first reported the friend with whom they interact most frequently after
lectures. The third-reported friend has the weakest ties to the survey respondent.
No survey respondent reported meeting their third friend every day after lectures.
The type of network (e.g. a mostly upper-caste friendship network or a network with
all high-achieving friends) signals both the resources available to the student as well
as the type of student they are. Our current analysis focuses on the distributional
impact of incentives on the different types of networks defined along the lines of
caste and ability, where ability is measured using baseline university test scores. A
network can also be defined in terms of strength, measured by the probability that a
relationship is reciprocal. We analyze the impact of reciprocal networks. Reciprocity
in friendship predicted positive effects on test scores.
Out of 5,905 surveys (about 45% of the full sample), data on the caste of 4,873
students (about 33% of the full sample) was successfully identified using college
administrative data. Students may organize themselves into friendship networks
by caste and ability. Some relevant facts about the baseline scores of the student
study networks in our data are as follows: lower-caste students who have all upper-
caste friends have a much higher-than-median GPA (6.82), compared to upper-caste
students who have all upper-caste friends; they have, on average, a GPA score of
6.5. This shows that lower caste students who organize themselves into upper-caste
friendship networks are, on average, of higher academic ability. Fig. 1.10.4 shows
that students with an above average baseline GPA have friends with higher GPAs
than friends of students with lower than average baseline GPAs. There is strong
evidence of assortative matching by test scores. Since lower-caste poor students have,
on average, very low test scores, they are likely to have low-ability close friends.
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1.3.4 Post-Intervention Survey Data
A post-intervention survey was administered at all 11 colleges, which asked the
students to rank the targeted and untargeted incentives given out by the researcher.
Additionally, the students were also asked the following question: if they could give
out prize incentives in colleges at that time, how would they allocate USD 11 between
three prize winners: 1) the winner who scores the highest in the cohort, 2) the winner
who scores the highest among the lower caste within the cohort, or 3) the winner who
scores the highest among the poor students whose family income is USD 2,340 or less.
Students were also asked, hypothetically, to mention their perception of the chances
of winning the prize money under untargeted, income- or caste-targeted schemes.
The students were encouraged to respond and express their opinions about the prize
incentives given out. The response rate in this survey was nearly 100% among those
who were present in class. This survey was self-administered and conducted in class
towards the end of lectures. Thus, the responses of those students that were not
present in class when the survey was conducted are not available. In neither of these
cases were the students told beforehand about the survey that would be conducted
during class.
After the university exams had been completed, a second survey was conducted
in only one college (due to logistical reasons) to record post-intervention friendship
networks. The respondents were asked to give the name of the student with whom
they had studied the most for the incentivized exam. They were also asked how
long they had known their study mate. This survey was conducted online, and
the students were not told that it was linked to research associated with the prize
money for exams. Drawing on Ga¨chter et al. (2015), questions were asked to measure
the degree to which students had bonded with their study mates. These questions
aimed to test whether the targeted incentives caused competition among friends and
friction between peers who had not been incentivized.
1.4 Model
Next, we present a simple extension of the basic tournament model of Lazear and
Rosen (1981) in order to guide our interpretation of the empirical analysis. Given
our setting of a team-based environment, where students rely on each other to
perform well in exams, and where teacher absenteeism is high and the quality of
teaching is poor, we abstract away from institutional channels that may impact on
student achievement in order to focus on the two margins through which tournament
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incentives impact on performance: (i) by motivating agents to exert effort, and (ii)
by changing peer group interaction.
Tournament incentives are shown to be very powerful at incentivizing perfor-
mance. Experimental research shows that tournament incentives are even more
powerful than predicted by the rational decision-making model (Dechenaux et al.
(2015)). Research shows that people value winning in itself and enjoy the recog-
nition afforded by relative rankings. A simple laboratory experiment shows that
more than 40% of individuals are willing to exert costly effort in order to win a
tournament in which the winning prize was 0 USD (Cason et al. (2010)). Several
field experiments, such as Kosfeld et al. (2014), have shown that, by simply honoring
the best performance publicly with a symbolic award, a manager may increase the
average performance of individuals. Thus, targeted tournament incentives that may
motivate contestants could also potentially demotivate colleagues who are excluded
from the competition.
Although tournaments can create powerful competitive incentives, there are some
disincentive effects of tournaments. Several experimental studies have shown that
tournament incentives induce non-cooperative behavior among contestants (Drago
and Garvey (1998)). In our experiment, we additionally explore the possibility of
non-cooperation between contestants and non-contestants.
1.4.1 The Basic Building Blocks
For simplicity, we consider the two-player tournament model, where the student with
the highest test score receives a fixed prize, i.e. Vj for student j. Since the exams
considered here are high-stakes university exams, which are a crucial factor in the
job market outcomes of students, we introduce a parameter Mj that captures the
utility from the scores obtained in university exams. Additionally, we introduce the
possibility of an encouragement or discouragement effect for being excluded from
participating in tournaments, which may vary according to the demographic groups
that are able to participate in the tournament. This we denote as T tj for student j.
T tj for student j can be interpreted as how a student feels about obtaining high test
scores in university exams when he will not be recognized for his achievements but
his colleagues will be given the recognition.
The test score of a student is a random variable whose distribution is controlled
by the student’s effort to prepare for exams. However, a given realization of a test
score also depends on random factors that are beyond the student’s control.
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Therefore, a student j has test score qj, which follows Prendergast (1999)
qj = µj + aj + j (1.1)
Where, µj is the level of effort chosen by student j prior to the realization of
the random luck component j that has density g and cdf G. Each agent differs in
ability, denoted by aj for student j. Higher ability increases the chances of success
for any given level of effort. Average skill is produced at a cost denoted by C(.) that
is increasing in effort µ.
We assume that G(.) has a symmetric distribution; that is,
G() = 1−G(−)
for all . It follows that the density function, g(.), then satisfies g() = g(−). We
also assume that g is unimodal5 and satisfies g′() ≤ 0. The student’s education
production function follows (1), and the winner of the prize is determined by the
largest drawing of q. Each player plays against the “field”. Each player does not
observe the precise number of hours that a peer engages in study for the purpose of
the exam.
We assume that any student can reach out to his/her colleagues to help him or her
prepare for exams. Additionally, each student can have closer ties with a subgroup
of their colleagues with whom they call friends. Group study with colleagues is
assumed to reduce the cost of effort for the student in preparing for exams. To
illustrate this assumption, consider a student who has not understood a concept
taught in class. The student can read books to understand the concept or approach
a teacher, who might not have enough time available to answer all the student’s
questions. Alternatively, the student can approach a student who is relatively good
at their studies to explain the study material. This can save the student time in
looking for the appropriate reference books or waiting for the teacher’s availability
to help with the required studies. Formally, it is written as follows:
C(µj, Sj(f, c)) (1.2)
5The assumption of a unimodal distribution is usual in tournament models, see, for example,
Dixit (1987), Drago et al. (1996), Hvide (2002), Chen (2003)
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where µj is the effort of the student j, Sj(f, c) is the availability of study resources
from classmates who are friends f , and from peers who are just classmates (denoted
as c) of the student j. C(.) is a convex function of effort µj. S is an increasing func-
tion of f and c. Cµ,s is a decreasing function, which implies that a higher exchange
of resources among peers reduces the cost of individual effort on exams. S measures
how resourceful your friends are. We do not endogenize S(.). For simplicity, it is
assumed to be an environment that can be affected by tournaments. For example, in
the case of untargeted tournaments, the high-ability students might wish to spend
more time studying on their own and might not wish to spend much of their time
helping low-ability students, should they seek support in their studies. In the case of
targeted tournaments, colleagues might find targeting unfair and refuse to offer help
to the beneficiaries, or the beneficiaries might hesitate to ask the excluded group for
their time. We denote Sj(f, c)
C as the student interaction available to student j in
the control group, Sj(f, c)
U as the student interaction available to student j under
the untargeted tournament conditions, i.e. pure merit tournament, and Sj(f, c)
T as
student interaction available to student j in the targeted tournament.6
1.4.2 Payoffs
Formally, each student maximizes the following preference function:
[PjVj]D +Mjqj + (T
t
j ∗B)Dqj − C(µj, Sj(f, c)) (1.4)
where D is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the cohort is assigned
to a tournament, otherwise it takes the value 0. B is an indicator variable that
takes the value 1 if the student is assigned as a non-beneficiary, otherwise it takes
the value 0. Since the university test score is a high stakes exam, the student’s
expected utility has a motivation factor Mjqj, regardless of incentives. Vj is the
value of the monetary award to student j, where Pj is the probability of winning
the tournament. The probability that any student j wins the tournament while
competing with student −j is:
6 To ensure the existence of pure strategy equilibria in the tournament, we assume that,
sup∆µ,∆aV |g(∆µ+ ∆a)| < infµ>0c′′(µ, S) (1.3)
This implies that the cost curve needs to sufficiently convex
24
Pj = Prob(qj > q−j) = Prob(µj − µ−j + aj − a−j > j − i) (1.5)
where, j − i ≡ γ and γ ∼g, where E(γ)=0 and E(γ2)= 2σ2
It is important to note that this model is the same as the standard tournament
model with asymmetric costs, with only one additional modification. In our theory,
we assume that tournament incentives not only change the benefit from scoring high
in exams but can also potentially change the cost of effort of the student. The way
that cost of effort may change because of competitive incentives depends on whether
academic support from peer’s changes as a result of competition. We allow for the
possibility that changes in peer interaction will differ with the income and caste of
the student.
1.4.3 Equilibrium
For simplicity, we assume Vj = V, ∀j ; Mj = M ∀j and T tj = T t ∀j. Insight from the
model will remain unchanged if we do not impose the above restrictions and assume
a representative agent from each socio-economic group.
The equilibrium characterized here is from the perspective of any student j in
each of the treatment and control groups.
No Incentives: Control Group
Assuming that an interior equilibrium exists, the equilibrium level of effort is char-
acterized by the following first order condition:
M = C ′(µj, Sj(f, c)C) (1.6)
Equilibrium effort is
µ∗j = C
′−1(M ;Sj(f, c)C) (1.7)
Since C(.) is a convex function, C ′−1(.) is monotonic. Here, there are two effects
that drive effort in the control group. The first is the motivation to perform well on
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exams, and the second is the social network effect that reduces the cost of exerting
effort in exams. Higher M and S induce students to exert more effort.
Untargeted Tournaments
Student j assigned to an untargeted tournament exerts an effort that satisfies the
following best response function:
M + g(µj − µ−j + aj − a−j)V = C ′(µj, Sj(f, c)U) (1.8)
and student −j competing with student j under untargeted tournaments exerts
effort as follows:
M + g(µj − µ−j + aj − a−j)V = C ′(µ−j, S−j(f, c)U) (1.9)
using symmetry assumption of G(.) , we get g(µj − µ−j + aj − a−j) = g(−µj +
µ−j − aj + a−j)
The tournament contestants have three effects that determine the equilibrium
effort of any student j. The first term on L.H.S of the F.O.C is the motivation of any
student j to do well on high stakes exams. The second term on the L.H.S captures
the competition effect of the standard theory of contests, which predicts a fall in
effort as differences in ability among contestants rise. The R.H.S is the effort and
the network effect on cost of effort. If all students have access to everyone in class,
then costs across students within a class will differ only if student’s efforts differ. If
students do not have access to everyone in class but just to their close ties, such as
friends, then students who have access to more resourceful friends will have a lower
cost of exerting effort in exams.
Income Targeting
We have two forms of targeting in our framework: economic and social. Under
the targeted incentives, student j can be a beneficiary or a non-beneficiary. We
characterize the equilibrium for any student j in each of these cases.
Under economic targeting, any student j, competing with student −j, chooses
effort µj that satisfies the following:
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M + g(µj − µ−j + aj − a−j)V = C ′(µj, Sj(f, c)income) (1.10)
In addition, her competitor, say student−j, chooses effort µ−j using the following
best response function:
M + g(µj − µ−j + aj − a−j)V = C ′(µ−j, S−j(f, c)income) (1.11)
using symmetry assumption of G(.) , we get g(µj − µ−j + aj − a−j) = g(−µj +
µ−j − aj + a−j)
If Sj(f, c)
income = S−j(f, c)income, then the equilibrium effort will be symmetric
and will only be a function of the level of competition aj − a−j. Greater differences
in ability will induce low-ability students to exert low effort. The best response of
high-ability students will then be to exert low effort in equilibrium. In the case
of asymmetric costs, Sj(f, c)
income 6= S−j(f, c)income. The student that has a cost
advantage will exert higher effort. In our set up, our treatment creates variation in
cost advantages among the contestants by changing co-operation among colleagues
that study for the same exam. Therefore, the above best response functions will
provide predictions on the heterogeneities in outcomes among contestants of the
tournaments.
Under economic targeting, if student j is a non-beneficiary, the equilibrium effort
exerted by the student j is given by:
M + T = C ′(µj, Sj(f, c)income) (1.12)
The equilibrium effort reduces to the following first order condition:
µ∗j = C
′−1(M ;T income;Sj(f, c)income) (1.13)
The equilibrium effort of students excluded from the tournaments will only be
affected if their motivation to do well in exams is affected T income 6= 0 or if their
quality of academic support is affected Sj(f, c)
income 6= Sj(f, c)C .
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Caste Targeting
Similarly, under caste targeting, we have the following characterization:
Any student j, competing with student −j, chooses effort µj that satisfies the
following:
M + g(µj − µ−j + aj − a−j)V = C ′(µj, Sj(f, c)caste) (1.14)
In addition, her competitor, say student −j, chooses effort µ−j to satisfy the
following best response function:
M + g(µj − µ−j + aj − a−j)V = C ′(µ−j, S−j(f, c)caste) (1.15)
using the symmetry assumption of G(.) , we get g(µj − µ−j + aj − a−j) =
g(−µj + µ−j − aj + a−j)
Under caste targeting, if student j is a non-beneficiary, the equilibrium effort
exerted by the student j is given by:
M + T caste = C ′(µj, Sj(f, c)caste) (1.16)
The equilibrium effort is as follows:
µ∗j = C
′−1(M ;T caste;Sj(f, c)caste) (1.17)
Here again, the equilibrium effort of the non-beneficiary is affected only if the tar-
geted policies change his motivation to score high in exams or his academic support
system.
To better understand the motivation and peer effect channel of our model, con-
sider the case where Sj(f, c)
p = Sj(f, c)
C = Sj(f, c)
U , where p = {caste, income}
∀j and T tj = 0. In this case, both untargeted and targeted incentive schemes will
unambiguously increase average effort relative to the control group, where no incen-
tives were given. Changes in effort relative to the control group for both contestants
and non-contestants occur if tournaments change the motivation to perform well in
addition to the academic support from peers required to perform well.
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There is a third very important parameter that has not been incorporated in
the model, which is the size of the tournament contest. Since our experiment varies
competition types, both in relation to the size of the contest and the socio-economic
features of the contestants, the interaction term of the proportion of the contest
size and social groups will be the relevant parameter to test. For simplicity, we
keep the size of the contest constant in the model to first understand the way
the motivation channel and social network channel operate to impact on student
achievement. Then, we infer how the proportion of incentivized students could
impact on outcomes, e.g. the proportion of incentivized students will indicate the
proportion of students who are being excluded so that if the excluded students are
demotivated for being excluded from the opportunity and reduce effort in exams,
the average scores of the cohort will be affected only if the disincentive effects are
large enough.
Proposition 1 If for the non-beneficiary student j, Sj(f, c)
p = Sj(f, c)
C, where
p = {caste, income}, then the equilibrium effort of the non-beneficiaries in targeted
incentives will fall relative to the control group if T tj < 0.
If non-beneficiaries find targeted incentives unfair and feel demotivated, then
keeping the quality of peer interaction unchanged relative to the control group,
optimal effort exerted by the non-beneficiaries, in equilibrium will be lower than
that in the control group.
The above proposition highlights the importance of the motivation channel in
explaining the potential negative spillover effects of targeting. Since the experiment
is about targeting students from poor social groups, the non-beneficiaries of the
targeted incentives are economically better off by construction. The advantaged
socio-economic groups, on average, have higher pre-test exam scores. Therefore,
if targeting causes a rift between low ability beneficiaries and high ability non-
beneficiaries, the high ability non-beneficiaries are less likely to experience negative
effects on the quality of study support. Therefore, the above proposition that keeps
the quality of the study group of the non-beneficiaries unchanged is realistic.
Proposition 2 If Sj(f, c)
p < Sj(f, c)
C,where p = {caste, income}, then the effort
of the beneficiaries will fall relative to the control group if the cost of effort due to
changing peer interaction is higher than the gain from exerting effort in the contest.
Targeted tournaments incentivize the beneficiaries to exert effort in exams. How-
ever, targeted incentives can have a negative externality on test scores by creating
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a tension between the beneficiaries and the excluded peer group. Given that effort
is complementary, if the excluded peer group does not co-operate with the benefi-
ciaries, such that the quality of academic support from peers falls compared to the
control group, then the cost of effort to increase test scores will rise for the bene-
ficiaries. The targeted tournaments can increase the equilibrium effort exerted by
the beneficiaries relative to the control group only if the gain from the incentives
outweighs the cost of exerting effort in exams.
Proposition 3 If targeted financial incentives disrupt cooperation among class-
mates but not among friends, denoted as f in S compared to the control group,
then, under such schemes, contestants with higher S, i.e. contestants with resource-
ful friends, will have positive effects on test scores.
Students with resourceful friendship links will have higher S. This will reduce the
cost of effort for the students. Tournaments generate incentive effects for the con-
testants. However, if tournament incentives disrupt co-operation among colleagues
who are distant and not among the subgroup of colleagues who are close friends,
then the cost of effort will be lower only for those contestants who have resourceful
friendship ties. This will cause effort and hence the test scores of students with
productive friendship ties to rise. The test scores of disadvantaged students who do
not receive support will fall if the cost of effort outweighs the incentive effects of
financial rewards.
1.5 Estimation Strategy
To test whether the provision of tournament incentives affects test scores, we es-
timate the intent-to-treat effects of financial incentives using the following specifi-
cation for student i, in department d, in faculty f , and in year t of his studies at
college c.
yidftc = uftc + βAdftc + γCdftc + αIdftc + idftc (1.18)
where, yidftc is the outcome variable of student i, in department d, in faculty f ,
in study year t, and at college c. We express grades as a z score, standardizing them
by the full sample mean and full sample standard deviation, so that our coefficient of
interest can be interpreted as the standard deviation (SD) change in the university
30
grade point averages associated with the incentives. uftc refers to the randomized
strata dummies over faculty, study year, and college level (Bruhn and McKenzie
(2009)), Adftc is the dummy for the treatment of untargeted incentives i.e. incentives
for all, Cdftc is the dummy for the treatment of caste-targeted incentives, where only
lower castes within the cohort compete, and Idftc is the treatment of economic-
targeted incentives, where only poor students within the cohort compete. We allow
for our errors to be correlated within the cohort by clustering our standard errors
idftc at the cohort level. Barrios et al. (2012) view clustering as a design problem
and show that within group correlation is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition
for clustering standard errors. They suggest that correlation between the errors
and covariates that are not randomly assigned could imply inter-cluster correlation,
in which case the standard errors need to take account of this correlation. As a
robustness check, we also clustered standard errors at the level of college-faculty-
year of study, which reduced the number of clusters from 470 to 106.
The primary outcome of the analysis is the grade point average of the university
semester exams. Given that these are high-stakes exams, dropout rates are low. 92
percent of the students took the university exams, and there is no difference in the
dropout rates between the treatments and the control.
We want to estimate the effects of incentives on student effort that increase
the test scores of the students. Thus, to estimate the effect of student effort on
educational attainment, we cannot have teacher biases in grading confounding the
impact of the incentives on student achievement. We achieve this by incentivizing
university exams that are graded centrally and are not marked by teachers that
teach the courses in the colleges. Additionally, the identities of the students in the
exams remain anonymous. Given that college syllabuses are also set centrally by the
university at the beginning of each academic year, there is no scope for the teachers
or college management to change the level of the courses in response to incentives.
Additionally, university level grading of approx. 360 colleges that includes more
than 50,000 students in total, of which we only have a very small fraction in our
sample, along with college fixed effects solves our grading on a curve problem.
Unlike other studies in the literature on performance-based incentives, such as
those carried out by Kremer et al. (2009); Angrist et al. (2009); Burgess et al. (2016),
we have mitigated the channel via which teachers or college authorities can impact
the test scores of students in response to incentives by increasing the quality of
teaching. The incentives were announced in every college towards the end of term
and a month before the exams. All colleges had about two weeks of lectures left
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before they all closed for three weeks for the autumn festival (Durga Festival) in the
month of October. Exams took place when the colleges re-opened. Additionally,
all colleges suffer from a high level of student absenteeism because students prefer
to study either on their own or in study groups or take private tuition rather than
attending lectures because of the poor quality of teaching in public colleges. The rate
of absenteeism increases towards the end of the term and closer to the exams, when
students prefer to take study leave. Given the high level of student absenteeism,
there was very little scope left for the teachers to increase their quality of teaching
and convince students to attend lectures as a response to incentives during the last
two weeks of term.
The parameters of interest are β, γ, and α, where the null hypotheses are β = 0,
γ = 0, and α = 0. Our main identifying assumption is that, in the absence of
tournament incentives, there would be no differences in the test scores between the
students in the treated groups, relative to the control group. Thus, for incentives
to change the test scores of the treated cohort without changing the test scores of
the untreated cohort, there can be no spillovers or complementarities in terms of
study effort between the treated and control cohorts. Given that the treatments
were randomized across departments and only among major students that do not
share common curriculum across departments, the experiment design has ruled out
spillovers in terms of study effort between treated and untreated cohorts.
Nevertheless, the interpretation of β,γ and α as an effect on the incentives of test
scores, compared to when no incentives were provided, could be contaminated by the
fact that the students in each treatment group could be aware of different incentives
provided to other classes. The effect could be interpreted as the response to which
incentives are provided to the class the student belongs to versus those offered to
students in other classes. However, since students studying major subjects only have
major class lectures among themselves, and they spend a greater number of hours
in lectures amongst their classmates, the spillover effect of the above type is likely
to be very low. Moreover, we believe that students are less likely to be affected by
opportunities in other departments, as students studying different majors already
have different career tracks and job placements.
1.6 Impact of Incentives
Table 1.12.1 shows that only tournament incentives targeted towards the poor had
an impact on the test scores of the cohort that were exposed to the incentives. We
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find statistically significant negative effects on the test scores of the treated cohort,
compared to the cohort that received no incentives. The mean deterioration in
grades .14 SDs (s.e = .053) of student performance is significant at a 1% level of
significance. The significance of the coefficient of interest is robust to college-faculty-
year level, which yields s.e = .0537.7 We compute randomisation inference p values
for individual coefficients using Young (2015) randcmd code. The randomisation (c)
p values for untargeted treatment .54, for caste targeting is .51 . The randomisation
(c) p values for income targeting is significant at .013. the randomisation (t) p values
for untargeted treatment is .52, for caste targeting is .50 and for income targeting
is significant at .02.
This is the first evidence in the literature of performance-based financial incen-
tives, where economic targeting has reduced the average test scores of the treated
cohort. In the tournament incentive program for girls in Kenyan primary schools
studied by Kremer et al. (2009), average test scores of the girls increased by .19
SD. They also observed significant improvement in teacher attendance in program
schools, establishing a plausible behavioral mechanism that explains the test score
gains for girls and boys in program schools. In our setting, human capital externali-
ties in response to incentives are more likely to happen via interactions among peers
than by behavioral changes of the teacher. Targeted incentives that excluded col-
leagues from the opportunity to participate in the achievement awards competition
could have disrupted academic cooperation among peers, which could potentially
explain the negative outcome.
We also find no average effect on test scores when students are exposed to caste-
based incentives. We find no effect on the lower castes, who are directly incentivized,
and find a small negative and statistically insignificant effect on the upper caste in
the treated cohorts, relative to the cohorts that received no incentives. In the exper-
imental economic literature, Hickman (2013) and Calsamiglia et al. (2013) studied
incentive effects of affirmative actions by making disadvantaged students compete
among themselves. The papers find that such tournaments increased average human
capital investment and exam performance for the majority of the disadvantaged stu-
dents targeted by the policy. In our setting, it had no effect on the disadvantaged
social groups, i.e. the lower castes. The lower castes are over-represented (approxi-
mately 50% in each cohort) in this study’s sample colleges due to affirmative actions
7Clustering at the level of college-faculty-year has no effect on the standard errors, thereby ruling
out the possible existence of correlation across cohorts. Clustering at the level of college reduces
the standard errors, indicating that, with the number of clusters reduced to 11, the estimates could
be erroneous.
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that are nationally in place in India. Therefore, it is plausible that the competition
that includes more than half of the cohort tends to replicate the competition that
includes the entire cohort. We do find that the effect of social targeting is the same
as that of untargeted incentives. One may argue that lower castes do not respond
to incentives due to the caste stigma attached to caste incentives. We will show in
a later section that the stigma effect of caste is less likely to explain the absence of
any impact of social targeting.
We find no average effect of merit-based incentives. In the performance-based
incentive schemes studied by Levitt et al. (2011) and Angrist et al. (2009), they
found a positive impact of such schemes on students who are more likely to win
the prize, i.e. on marginal students. This caused such programs to have a positive
average impact on educational attainment. Tournament incentives are also known to
cause “discouragement effects” on academically weaker students (Sheremeta (2015)).
Therefore, the literature has found a heterogeneous effect of tournament incentives
on students of different abilities. We did not find evidence of such an effect in
our quantile treatment effect reported in Table 1.12.2. All quantiles of the score
distribution have no effect under both merit and caste targeting and have a negative
effect on test scores under income-targeted incentives. Both students in the upper
and lower quantiles in the incentivized tests performed substantially worse under
income targeting, compared to what the students would have achieved with no
incentives. The treatment effect is economically significant. Since poor students
have lower baseline test scores on average, the uniform effect of economic targeting
across the entire score distribution suggests that even poor eligible students are
also negatively affected. We further tested whether heterogeneity in ability that
affects the chances of winning contests affects outcomes. The Table 1.12.3 shows
that heterogeneity in ability does not impact outcomes under incentives.
The results suggest that the size of the proportion of individuals targeted un-
der affirmative action policies matters. In our setting, targeting not only changed
the demographic composition of the contestants but also the number of students
competing for the prize. The paper finds a significant negative effect only in the
income-targeted contest which, incidentally, also incentivized a small proportion of
the students (approx. 10%). In our next section, we examine whether negative
impacts were driven by students not eligible for achievement awards.
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1.7 Heterogeneous Effect of Income Targeting
Proposition 1 predicts that if targeted tournaments upset non-beneficiaries such
that they feel demotivated for being excluded from the opportunity, then they will
experience a fall in test scores. Furthermore, if tension among beneficiaries and
non-beneficiaries reduces cooperation in academics, the disadvantaged beneficiaries,
who are, on average, low-ability students that could potentially benefit from study-
ing with high-ability peers, will also be adversely affected. In our set up, income
targeting that excluded, on average, 90% of the cohort from tournament incentives
had a significant negative average effect on test scores.
We first use the following specification to estimate the spillover effects of income
targeting.
yidftc = ustc + δIdftc ∗ poor + τpoor + αIdftc + idftc (1.19)
where, yidftc is the outcome variable of student i, in department d, in faculty f ,
in study year t, and at college c. We express grades as a z score, standardizing them
by the full sample mean and full sample standard deviation. Idftc is a dummy for
cohorts where tournament incentives are provided only to poor students and poor
is a dummy where the student has a family income of and below USD 2,340. ustc is
our randomization stratum. The spillover effect is captured in α, and the differential
effect on the poor students due to income-targeted incentives is the coefficient δ.
Using only sample colleges, involving 5,683 students, where administrative data
on income was collected from the students at the point of admission and before our
intervention, we estimate the spillover effects of targeting the poor. Table 1.12.4
find that income targeting has a significant negative effect on the test scores of
students who are excluded from such incentives. Furthermore, we cannot rule out
the hypothesis that poor students are not equally adversely affected in terms of test
scores. It is plausible that, due to low power, we are unable to detect differential
negative effects on the poor. It is also possible that we do not cluster our standard
errors correctly. Therefore, to address the issues on inference, we further conduct
Fisher’s randomisation inference test using Young (2015) randcmd code. We find
randomization inference (c) p values for the spillover efects is .038 and randomization
inference (t) p value to be .039.
To further show the effect of being demotivated for being excluded from the
opportunity to win prize incentives, we estimate the intent-to-treat effects of finan-
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cial incentives on cohorts where there are no poor students as per pre-intervention
administrative records. In such cohorts no student was eligible for income targeted
awards. In the subsample, where pre-intervention administrative records are avail-
able, there are 204 cohorts, of which 102 cohorts have no poor students and 67
cohorts have poor students higher than 10 per cent. We use only the subsample of
102 cohorts where there are no poor students to identify the resentment effect of
announcing income targeted incentives on the test scores of students.
We use the following specification for student i, in department d, in faculty f ,
and in year t of his studies at college c.
yidftc = uftc + βAdftc + γCdftc + αIdftc + idftc (1.20)
where, yidftc is the outcome variable of student i, in department d, in faculty f ,
in study year t, and at college c. We express grades as a z score, standardizing them
by the full sample mean and full sample standard deviation, so that our coefficient of
interest can be interpreted as the standard deviation (SD) change in the university
grade point averages associated with the incentives. uftc refers to the randomized
strata dummies over faculty, study year, and college level (Bruhn and McKenzie
(2009)), Adftc is the dummy for the treatment of untargeted incentives i.e. incentives
for all, Cdftc is the dummy for the treatment of caste-targeted incentives, where only
lower castes within the cohort compete, and Idftc is the treatment of economic-
targeted incentives, where only poor students within the cohort compete. We allow
for our errors to be correlated within the cohort by clustering our standard errors
idftc at the cohort level. We find significant negative effect of higher magnitude on
the test scores of the students as shown in Table 1.12.5
This is the first paper to provide evidence on the negative spillover effects of
targeted tournament incentives. Theoretically, Milgrom and Roberts (1988) and
empirically, there is evidence of sabotage and counterproductive behavior among
participants that compete in tournaments, but there is no evidence on the effect
of peers that are excluded from tournaments. Targeted tournament incentives are
a form of affirmative action policies implemented by policymakers to provide the
weaker socio-economic groups with a level playing field. Bagde et al. (2016) and
Bertrand et al. (2010) examine the impact of affirmative action policies in admissions
into engineering colleges in India, using RDD design on marginal students who
gain admission into university, and those who fail to gain admission. They found
positive effects on the educational attainment and labor market outcomes of the
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beneficiaries. The average effect on educational outcomes of the non-beneficiaries
that get displaced have remained unexplored. This paper provides evidence that
affirmative action policies could yield negative outcomes for the non-beneficiaries
and possibly the beneficiaries.
Since competition were randomized in every faculty in every colleges, we also
evaluate the average effect of income targeting in competitions within every fac-
ulty in every college. Fig. 1.10.5 displays the treatment effect coefficients (and its
95% confidence interval) university test scores in each of the 59 tournaments.8 In
the majority of these groups, the income targeting had a negative average effect
on student achievement. Interestingly enough, 8 of the groups have experienced
statistically significant positive effects. We find groups that have positive effects
of income targeting are driven by colleges in poorest district (Hailakandi district).
Income records of most of these colleges were not available. While groups that have
negative significant effects of income targeting have lower proportion of eligible poor
students (.09) with their non poor colleagues having above median baseline scores
(7.94). The effect of proportion of poor students eligible for prize incentives and ef-
fect of income targeting is reported Table B2 using only the sample of colleges where
pre-intervention administrative data was used to identify poor students with family
income USD 2,340 and below. This suggests that in targeted incentives, proportion
of students excluded from targeting has an effect on student performance. List et al.
(2014), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Loury (1979), show that contest size impacts
performance by affecting the chances of winning the prize of the contestants. The
novel contribution of our paper is that it shows that tournaments affects peers of
contestants who are excluded from the contest and both proportion and the socio-
economic characteristics of the excluded peers can potentially explain the effect on
the outcomes of beneficiaries and the non-beneficiaries. Our paper cannot disentan-
gle the two channels but can provide suggestive evidence of the importance of the
role played by social and economic status of the disadvantaged groups in affecting
outcomes by examining the effects of incentives on reported pre-intervention close
friendship networks.
1.7.1 Explaining Negative Spillovers
The literature on affirmative action policies in firms and organizations (Harrison
et al. (2006); Shteynberg et al. (2011); Lynch (1989) has found a backlash among
8There are 59 tournaments because we evaluated the competitions by faculty and year in non-
engineering colleges and only by faculty in engineering college.
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non-beneficiaries, who may feel unfairly disadvantaged by these policies. We ex-
amined whether targeted incentives generated disapproval for the groups receiving
prize incentives.
We conducted an attitude survey a week after announcing the tournament in-
centives, where we asked students to divide USD 11 between the winners of three
types of tournaments: untargeted, caste-targeted and income-targeted tournaments.
Using the post intervention attitude survey of the sample, which exhibits the same
effect of incentives on student test scores as the full sample, as reported in Table B3,
we measured whether relative support for the winners of untargeted tournaments,
i.e. pure merit tournaments, rises among cohorts where only poor students are in-
centivized, in comparison to cohorts where everyone is incentivized. Table 1.12.6
shows that support for the winners of pure merit tournaments rises, and Table 1.12.7
shows that support for the winners of income-targeted tournaments falls in cohorts
where only the poor are incentivized, relative to cohorts where untargeted incen-
tives are given. The randomization inference-c p values for support for winners of
untargeted tournaments is .10 and randomization-t p value for the coefficient of
treatment effects of untargeted tournaments is .11. The treatment coefficient of
income targeting has p value of .11 under randomization inference-c and .10 under
randomization inference-t. One may argue that cohorts where poor students are
receiving incentives might express support for merit winners, not because they find
targeting unfair but because they think they can now express support for merit
winners because poor students are already receiving benefits under our scheme. By
this logic, cohorts who received caste incentives should also have supported other
types of winners more than lower-caste winners. However, we do not observe this
pattern in the data. Table 1.12.8 find that cohorts who receive caste targeting are
more likely to support lower-caste winners relative to other winners, in comparison
to cohorts where everyone is eligible for the prize incentives. The p values for the
coefficient randomization inference c is .07 and for randomization inference-t, it is
.05. We also find that lower castes are more likely to support lower-caste winners
over others.
The result on attitudes shows that targeting caused cohorts receiving income tar-
geting to seek merit tournaments and reduce support for winners of income-based
tournaments. We interpret this as a possible tension between the poor beneficia-
ries and the non-poor non-beneficiaries, due to targeting. This can cause non-
beneficiaries to become demotivated to perform well in exams, or it may cause
non-beneficiaries to perform even better in exams to show that it is them who de-
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serve the prize incentives. The negative effect on the test scores suggests exclusion
from the prize incentives possibly generated the former effect and demotivated the
non-beneficiaries.
The attitude survey is also consistent with a small insignificant negative effect
on caste targeting. We find that caste targeting increased support for lower-caste
winners, and this was driven by the lower castes. The lower castes are the majority
in university cohorts. Therefore, the negative spillover of caste targeting is very
small and statistically insignificant.
Another explanation for the negative spillover could be that the spillover effect
of being excluded from tournaments may be driven by high-ability students, who
want to sort themselves into merit-based tournaments. The literature on tourna-
ment incentives shows that more able and less risk averse agents sort themselves
into tournament incentives (see, Sheremeta (2015)). Table 1.12.9 cannot rule out no
differential negative spillover effects by student ability in the sample, where admin-
istrative data on income is available. In the attitude survey, we find that students
with higher baseline scores are more likely to show support for merit tournaments.
It is plausible that all students excluded from prize incentives were disappointed in
not being given the opportunity; however, the demotivating effect could be larger
for students who are able and more likely to win prize incentives.
1.7.2 Effect on beneficiaries: A friend in need
By Proposition 3, if tournament incentives create tension among colleagues that are
distant, without affecting intimate friendship ties within the cohort, then contestants
who have high-ability friends should experience a positive impact on test scores. We
used the friendship data of a large part of the sample, collected at the baseline, to
estimate the causal effects of incentives on the close network types that students
had organized themselves into before the study’s intervention.
We examined the heterogeneous impact of friendship ties on the test scores of
low- and high-ability students under different incentives. We measured the ability
of students using baseline GPAs in university exams. High-achieving students are
students with higher than median baseline scores (i.e. 6.5). Since students in their
freshman year have not yet taken any university exams, we only included data on
students from higher degree years.
Table 1.12.10 shows that low-ability students, i.e. students with below average
baseline scores, experience, on average, a negative impact on test scores when only
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poor students are incentivized. However low-ability students that have organized
themselves into a high-achieving network experience a positive effect on test scores
under income targeting, compared to the low-ability students with no incentives.
Here, the results are robust to the number of high-achieving friends that a student
reports having. High-ability students who have high-achieving friends do not ex-
perience any effects due to income targeting, but they experience a positive effect
on test scores under untargeted tournaments. Since a low-ability student is more
likely to be poor, the above result can be interpreted as income-targeted incentives
benefiting poor students that have organized themselves into resourceful friendship
networks before our intervention. High-ability students are likely to be non-poor,
and thus are ineligible under income targeting. The results suggest, therefore, that
non-poor students who have resourceful friends perform well under merit tourna-
ments. The network type predicts outcomes in response to incentives more than the
ability of the students.
If the social learning mechanisms of peer effects are at work (Bursztyn et al.
(2014) ), the results are in line with the literature on peer effects, which suggest
that peer effect is generally asymmetric; for instance, Hoxby (2000) found that low-
achieving students benefit from having high-achieving friends. However, it may be
that there is no change in peer interaction, and the effect of incentives is reflec-
tive of student type rather than the effect of peer support. Manski (1993) defines
exogenous effects of peers as the effects driven by a peer’s background that could
be correlated with the student’s background. The student that sorted him/herself
into a resourceful network could have a background that predicts his/her outcomes
under incentives. In what follows, we illustrate suggestive evidence of changing in-
teractions among colleagues that could potentially explain the adverse outcomes of
targeted policies.
1.7.3 Direct Evidence of Changing Peer Interaction
By Proposition 2 and 3, the test scores of the beneficiaries of targeted incentives can
be negatively affected if colleagues do not cooperate with them in exam preparation.
Using the network data of a post-intervention survey conducted only in one college,
which also replicates the same impact on incentives as the aggregate sample reported
in Table B4, we provide direct evidence of changing peer interaction. The response
rate of the survey was 8%, and therefore we use this only as suggestive evidence of
changing peer interactions and peer effects at work.
In the survey, the students were asked to name a study mate that they worked
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with the most for the incentivized exams. The students had the option of typing
“none” if they did not have any study mates. A total of 27 students reported having
no study mates in the incentivized exams. The names of the study mates were
tracked back to their exam roll numbers using the exam roll list. The caste, income,
and baseline GPA of the study mates were recorded using college administrative
data.
Table 1.12.11 shows that, when incentivized, students turn to their close friends
for support. However, the level of intimacy among study mates is higher and sta-
tistically significant in cohorts where poor students are targeted with financial in-
centives. The level of intimacy among study mates falls from income targeting to
pure merit-based incentives. Due to small sample size, clustered robust standard
errors is likely to produce erroneous results. We use randomisation inference test to
estimate treatment effect coefficients (Young (2015)). We find that the p values for
cohorts treated with income based prize incentives are .053 with randomization-c
inference test and .044 with randomisation-t test. With incentives for all there is
no effect on test scores. The p values for treatment coefficient of untargeted incen-
tives using randomization inference-c method is .461 and randomization inference-t
method is .44. The p- values for caste treatment is .74 under both randomisation-c
and randomisation-t method. Our results suggest that students, on average, receive
support from very close friends to prepare for exams when treated with economic
targeting. This effect is reduced as more students are included in the prize tourna-
ments. In untargeted tournaments, when all in the cohort are eligible for incentives,
study support is not restricted to close friends.
Table 1.12.12 shows that students under income targeting found, on average,
lower-achieving study mates when compared to the control group with no incentives.
The p values for the treatment effect coefficient under randomization-c method is
.07 for income targeting and no significant effect under caste or untargeted incen-
tive treatments. This suggests that income targeting disrupts the communication
between high- and low-achieving students within the class. Consequently, students
found cooperation amongst relatively low-achieving students, compared to the con-
trol group where no incentives were provided.
Using the pre-intervention network data from the large sample of students, the
figure depicts that there is positive assortative sorting in friendship ties. Students
with above average baseline scores have, on average, high-ability friends, and stu-
dents who are low ability, i.e. those with below average baseline scores, have, on
average, friends who are low ability.
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Combining the evidence on the post-intervention network with the evidence on
the large data set of the pre-intervention network, we speculate that negative ef-
fects through income targeting come from the segregation caused by targeting and
the discouragement effect. Income targeting also produces large negative effects be-
cause income targeting in universities excludes almost the entire cohort from the
opportunity to win the prize incentives.
1.8 Robustness checks
Barrios et al. (2012) show that spatial correlation between randomly assigned clus-
ters may invalidate the use of variance estimators that incorporate only cluster
level outcome correlations. Our within college cluster randomisation may have spa-
tial correlation structure which may impact precision of treatment effect estimates.
Therefore, we redo our analysis of the effects of incentives where we cluster the
standard errors at college-faculty-year level, which is higher than the level of our
cluster, since correlations will be higher within a faculty among the same degree
year students studying the same college. The precision of our estimates are robust
to clustering standard errors at levels college-faculty-year level as reported in Ta-
ble 1.12.13. The standard errors change from .0530 to .0537 when standard errors
are clustered at college-faculty-year-of-study level which reduces clusters from 470
to 106. This shows that within college correlation between different departments
are low and thus clustering at levels higher than the cohort level does not impact
statistical significance of the outcomes.9 Next, we drop the engineering dept from
the sample and re do the analysis by clustering our specification at various levels.
We show in column (1) of Table 1.12.14 that our results from specification that
clusters standard errors at cohort level remain unchanged after dropping engineer-
ing college. We, then, also estimate the equation by clustering the standard errors
at college-faculty-year level. We find that our clusters reduce from 430 to 63 and
our standard errors remain unchanged at .06.
It is possible that our entire results are driven by colleges that are competitive
to begin with. In India, the most competitive colleges are the public engineering
colleges. Since returns to engineering degree is highest for undergraduates in India,
there is a stiff competition to gain admissions into public engineering colleges which
are limited in supply and highly reputed. Entry into engineering colleges not only
9We also did the analysis with standard errors clustered at the level of college, we find that the
standard errors reduced to .048, which indicate the cluster does not work for smaller number of
clusters
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depend on the scores of the school leaving exams but also the scores obtained in
entrance exams administered by the engineering colleges. Most of these exams are
administered at national or state level. Column (1) of Table 1.12.14 shows that
the removal of engineering colleges the removal of engineering colleges did not even
change the magnitude of the effects of income targeting. Another concern could be
that the experiment was conducted in two different states: Assam and Meghalaya,
where Meghalaya is a minority dominated state which is not representative of the
whole of India. It could be that the results are driven by institutions of minority
state, which could have implications on the generalizability of the results in Indian
context. Column (2) of Table 1.12.14 drops the colleges from Meghalaya and finds
that the results are unchanged. Since the freshman year received only one prize
incentives per cohort and higher years received two prize incentives per cohort,
results from higher years could be different. We do the analysis including only
higher years in the sample and find no change in the impact of incentives on test
scores as reported in Table 1.12.14.
1.9 Conclusion
This study conducted a field experiment to provide evidence on the effectiveness
of targeted and untargeted financial incentives on university test scores in poor
economies. We find that economically-targeted incentives, which incentivized the
smallest proportion of students, reduced the average test scores of all the cohort,
while social targeting that incentivized more than half the cohort and untargeted
incentives that incentivized the whole cohort did not affect the test scores. We find
that the negative effect of economic targeting was driven by peers who were not
given the opportunity to participate in the prize competition while their colleagues
were.
As is often the case in field experiments, the interpretation of the findings and
their wider applicability depend on the key features of the specific setting. In our
case, two features are of note. The first is that we assigned students to each incen-
tive scheme. In general, we expect incentives, such as merit-based or caste-based
scholarships, to affect the selection of students, since different schemes will attract
different types of agents. Coupled with this, the presence of peer effects might in-
duce disadvantaged students not to apply for income-based stipends. Second, a key
feature of our setting is the reliance on friends for study support due to the poor
educational infrastructure in most of our sample institutions. The role of peer effects
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might be smaller or even absent in other settings where there is a strong culture of
institutional support for weaker and low-income students.
In weak institutions, our main result has implications for affirmative action poli-
cies that exclude large demographic groups who are also resourceful. Evidence of
discontent among the advantaged groups and the consequent fall in test scores of
both the advantaged and disadvantaged social groups in a team-based environment
indicate that policymakers should take the degree of complementarities in input into
account while designing policies that cater to weak social groups.
However, the most interesting finding is that the backlash of the advantaged
groups did not have any effect on disadvantaged students who had close ties with
high-achieving students. We find that low ability students, in general, performed
worse under income targeting but that low ability students who sorted themselves
into friendship networks with high-achieving students before the intervention ben-
efited from income-targeted incentives. We provide suggestive evidence that this
effect is more than just the effect of a student’s background helping the student to
sort him/herself into a high-achieving friendship network. We provide evidence to
indicate that income targeting which disappointed a large proportion of the cohort
caused the poor students to find support from their closest friends, who, on average,
happened to be of low ability like themselves and could not provide the adequate
support required to increase their test scores. However, low ability students who
had close friendship ties with high-achieving friends had a positive impact on test
scores under income incentives.
The results above speak to the role that institutional support can play to neu-
tralize the effect of the non-cooperation of resourceful social groups on disadvan-
taged beneficiaries. This result brings forth the salience of the literature on the
role of teachers to improve the educational attainment of students from weak socio-
economic groups (Dobbie and Fryer Jr (2009); Fryer Jr (2014); Chetty et al. (2011)).
Our experiment bundled together two important parameters that could impact
on the student performance of both the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Each
tournament incentive in the experiment varied both the size and the demographic
groups of the contest. Our results on the heterogeneous impact on network types
suggest that social groups that are incentivized have an impact on test scores because
a student from a minority background will have a different social network than that
of a non-minority poor student. Also, if exclusion from the opportunity to achieve
awards demotivates students, then the proportion of students excluded could also
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potentially impact on outcomes. Further research is required to disentangle the two
effects in order to better design policies that cater to the need of minorities.
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1.10 Figures
Figure 1.10.1: A Example of Stratification by Arts and Science Faculties and by
year of Study in College A. T1 represents income treatment, T2 represents caste
treatment and T3 represents merit treatments.
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Figure 1.10.2: Time Line
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Figure 1.10.3: Distribution of Baselines Scores of Students whose parents earn USD
2,340 a year or below. Non minority refers to upper castes and Minority refers to
lower castes. Grade Point Average (GPA) below 3 implies failing the university
exam.
Figure 1.10.4: Assortative Matching by Test Scores
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Figure 1.10.5: Treatment Effect of Income Targeting.
Notes: The sample includes all undergraduate students in my sample. The figures plot the treat-
ment effects of income targeted incentives by faculty and and year in non-engineering colleges and
by faculty in engineering colleges and their 95% confidence intervals. Tournament groups in both
figures are ordered by significance and coefficient size.
Figure 1.10.6: Sample Descriptions
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1.11 Summary Statistics





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.12.1: Effect of Incentives on test scores
Z Scores
T1:Cohort with Income Targeted Incentives -0.147***
(0.053)
T2:Cohort with Caste Targeted Incentives -0.038
(0.050)




Randomisation inference (c) based p values for T1 .013
Bonferonni adjusted P values T1 .017
R-squared 0.498
Notes: Outcome variable is grade point average (GPA) of only major (hon-
ours) students in university exams standarised by full sample mean and
standard deviation. The exams are graded centrally by the university that
the colleges are affiliated to. The raw GPA is standardised using the mean
and the standard deviations of whole sample of the experiment. Income
Targeted Cohort is the cohort where only students whose annual family
income is USD 2,340 and below are incentivised. Caste Targeted Cohort
is the cohort where only lower castes within the cohort are incentivized.
Untargeted cohort is a cohort where all are incentivized. Regression speci-
fication has stratifying dummies as controls. Standard errors are clustered
at cohort level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The standard errors were

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































caste targeted*low var -0.137
(0.116)





Notes: Outcome variable is standardised grade
point average (GPA) of only major (honours)
students in university exams. The exams are
graded centrally by the university that the col-
leges are affiliated to. The raw GPA is stan-
dardised using the mean and the standard devi-
ations of whole sample of the experiment. Low
heterogeneity in baseline scores is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if the standard
deviation of baseline scores of the cohort (i.e.
the unit of randomisation) is below 1.3. The
table consists of full sample of students whose
baseline scores are available (N=6,401). Stan-
dard errors clustered at department-college-
year level. The regression contains stratifying
dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.12.4: Heterogeneous Effect of Income targeted Incentives
Z Score
T1:Cohort with Income Targeted Incentives -0.136***
(0.049)
Cohort with Income Targeted Incentives*poor student 0.038
(0.126)




Bonferroni corrected P value for T1 .02
Randomization Inference (c) p value for T1 .03
R-squared 0.368
Notes: Outcome variable is standardised grade point average (GPA) of only
major (honours) students in university exams. The exams are graded cen-
trally by the university that the colleges are affiliated to. The raw GPA is
standardised using the mean and the standard deviations of whole sample of
the experiment. Poor is a dummy if a student has family income below USD
2,340 per year. Income Targeted Cohort is the cohort where only students
whose annual family income is USD 2,340 and below are incentivised. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at cohort level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The standard errors were also corrected for multiple hypothesis testing using
Bonferonni’s correction method.
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Table 1.12.5: Demotivation Effect
Z Score
Cohort with Income Targeted Incentives -0.176*
(0.0915)
Cohort with Caste Targeted Incentives -0.0562
(0.0747)





Notes: The sample consists of cohorts where proportion of
poor students identified by pre-intervention administrative
income data is 0. Outcome variable is standardised grade
point average (GPA) of only major (honours) students in
university exams. The exams are graded centrally by the
university that the colleges are affiliated to. The raw GPA
is standardised using the mean and the standard deviations
of whole sample of the experiment. Poor is a dummy if
a student has family income below USD 2,340 per year.
Income Targeted Cohort is the cohort where only students
whose annual family income is USD 2,340 and below are
incentivised. Standard errors are clustered at cohort level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.12.6: Effect of Targeting on Attitudes
Merit Winners vs Other Winners
Cohort with Income Targeted Incentives 0.034*
(0.018)






Notes: The outcome variable is proportion of USD 11 dollars the survey respondent
would like to allot to the student who received highest GPA in the whole cohort. The
controls in this specifications are randomisation strata dummies, baseline test scores.
Here cohorts with targeted incentives are compared with cohorts that receive untargeted
i.e. merit based incentives.
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Table 1.12.7: Effect of Targeting on Attitudes
Poor Winners vs Others
Cohort with Income Targeted Incentives -0.0350**
(0.0175)





Notes: The outcome variable is proportion of USD 11 dollars the survey re-
spondent would like to allot to the student who received highest GPA among
the poor students whose family income is USD 2,340 and below in the whole
cohort. The controls in this specifications are randomisation strata dummies,
baseline test scores. Here cohorts with targeted incentives are compared with
cohorts that receive untargeted i.e. merit based incentives.
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Table 1.12.8: Effect of Targeting on Attitudes
Lower Caste Winner vs Others
Cohort with Income Targeted Incentives 0.00369
(0.012)









Notes: The outcome variable is proportion of USD 11 dollars the survey respondent
would like to allot to the student who received highest GPA among the poor students
whose family income is USD 2,340 and below in the whole cohort. The controls in this
specifications are randomisation strata dummies, baseline test scores. Here cohorts























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.12.10: Effect of Targeting on Network Types
Dep Vars: Z Score Low-Ability High-Ability
T1: Cohort with Income Targeted Incentives -0.173** -0.114
(0.087) (0.069)
T2: Cohort with Caste Targeted Incentives -0.0595 -0.013
(0.071) (0.067)
T3: Cohort with Untargeted Incentives -0.058 -0.084
(0.080) (0.067)












Notes: Outcome variable is standardised grade point average (GPA) of only major
(honours) students in university exams. The exams are graded centrally by the uni-
versity that the colleges are affiliated to. The raw GPA is standardised using the mean
and the standard deviations of whole sample of the experiment. Low ability student
is dummy variable of a student whose baseline score is below average, i.e. below 6.15.
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Table 1.12.11: Effect of Incentives on Studying with Close Ties
Strength of Intimacy with Study Partners IOS Scale Measure (1-7)
T1: Cohort with Income Targeted Incentives 0.663*
(0.366)
T2: Cohort with Caste Targeted Incentives 0.432
(0.315)




Randomization inference (c) p value T1 .053
R-squared 0.218
Notes: Outcome variable is measured using Simon Gaechter et al. (2015) IOS Scale
that is a measure commonly used in psychology to measure how connected one feels
to another. Standard errors are clustered at department-year-college level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
62
Table 1.12.12: Effect of Incentives on Type of Studymates
Friends Baseline scores
T1: Cohort with Income Targeted Incentives -0.938*
(0.484)
T2: Cohort with Caste Targeted Incentives -0.00715
(0.393)
T3: Cohort with Untargeted Incentives -0.814
(0.496)
Controls Yes
Randomization inference (c) p value T1 .07
Observations 97
R-squared 0.269
Notes: Outcome variable is the baseline GPA of the study mate of the respon-
dents.Standard errors are clustered at department-year-college level. Controls are
the stratifying dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.12.13: Robustness Checks
Z Score
T1: Cohort with Income Targeted Incentives -0.147***
(0.0537)
T2: Cohort with Caste Targeted Incentives -0.038
(0.038)




Bonferonni adjusted P values of T1 .02
Observations 12,998
Notes: Outcome variable is grade point average (GPA) of only ma-
jor (honours) students in university exams standarised by full sample
mean and standard deviation. The exams are graded centrally by the
university that the colleges are affiliated to. The raw GPA is stan-
dardised using the mean and the standard deviations of whole sample
of the experiment. Income Targeted Cohort is the cohort where only
students whose annual family income is USD 2,340 and below are
incentivised. Caste Targeted Cohort is the cohort where only lower
castes within the cohort are incentivized. Untargeted cohort is a
cohort where all are incentivized. Standard errors are clustered at
college-faculty-degree year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The standard errors were also corrected for multiple hypothesis test-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.13 Appendix A: Summary Statistics
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.14 Appendix B: Tables
Table B1: Placebo Test: Comparison of Baseline Scores and Post-
treatment scores on same sample of students
(1) (2)
Before-Treatment GPA Post-Treatment GPA
Income Targeting -0.00224 -0.346***
(0.136) (0.122)
Caste Targeting 0.141 -0.0913
(0.144) (0.114)




Notes: Outcome variable is standardised grade point average (GPA) of only major
(honours) students in university exams. The exams are graded centrally by the
university that the colleges are affiliated to. The raw GPA is standardised using
the mean and the standard deviations of whole sample of the experiment. The table
consists of full sample of students whose baseline scores and post-treatment GPA
scores are available (N=6,409). Standard errors clustered at department-college-
year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B2: Effect of Income Targeting and Proportion
of Poor
Coefficient of Income Targeting




Notes: Using only the sample where administrative records
of colleges were used to identify students we find positive cor-
relation of treatment effect estimates of income targeting and
proportion of poor studenst who are eligible for prize incen-
tives.
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Table B3: Impact of Incentives on Stu-
dents of Attitude
Z Score
Poor Treated Cohort -0.142*
(0.084)
Lower Caste Treated Cohort -0.085
(0.086)





Notes: Outcome variable is standardised
grade point average (GPA) of only major
(honours) students in university exams. The
exams are graded centrally by the univer-
sity. The raw GPA is standardised using the
mean and the standard deviations of whole
sample of students in the engineering college
in the experiment. Standard errors clustered
at cohort level. This sample consists of the
same students who reported their scholar-
ship preferences in the attitude survey ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B4: Impact of Incentives on Survey College
Z Score
T1:Cohort with Income targeted Incentives -0.222**
(0.0857)
T2:Cohort with Caste targeted Incentives 0.0126
(0.114)





Notes: Outcome variable is standardised grade point average
(GPA) of only major (honours) students in university exams.
The exams are graded centrally by the university. The raw
GPA is standardised using the mean and the standard devia-
tions of whole sample of students in the engineering college in
the experiment. Standard errors clustered at department level.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B6: Group Size and Tournament Incentives
Z Score
T1: Cohort with Income Targeted Incentives 0.0138
(0.0587)
T2:Cohort with Caste Targeted Incentives 0.0771
(0.0669)
T3:Cohort with Untargeted Incentives 0.00662
(0.0607)










Notes: Outcome variable is standardised grade point average (GPA)
of only major (honours) students in university exams. The exams
are graded centrally by the university that the colleges are affiliated
to. The raw GPA is standardised using the mean and the standard
deviations of whole sample of the experiment. Small Class (i.e. the
unit of randomisation) is dummy variable if the class size is below
48. The table consists of full sample of students in our experiment
who sat the university exams (N=12,998). Standard errors clustered
at department-college-year level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B7: Ability and Tournament Incentives
Z Score
T1: Cohort with Income Targeted Incentives -0.0756
(0.0935)
T2: Cohort with Caste Targeted Incentives -0.0136
(0.0979)
T3: Cohort with Untargeted Incentives -0.0459
(0.124)
High Scoring Class 0.370***
(0.0853)
T1* High Scoring Class -0.0775
(0.111)
T2* High Scoring Class -0.0191
(0.117)




Notes: Outcome variable is standardised grade point average
(GPA) of only major (honours) students in university exams. The
exams are graded centrally by the university that the colleges are
affiliated to. The raw GPA is standardised using the mean and
the standard deviations of whole sample of the experiment. High
Scoring Class (i.e. the unit of randomisation) is dummy variable
if the average GPA of the class is above 6.05. The table consists
of sample of students for whom data on basleine scores are avail-
able. Standard errors clustered at department-college-year level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Chapter 2
Impact of British Colonial
Reforms on Gender Differentiated
Human Capital Investments1
We analyze the long-term impact of colonial legal reforms of matrimonial law intro-
duced by the British in India in British provinces. Particularly, we examine the Child
Marriage Abolition Act of 1931 that raised the minimum legal age of marriage for
females to 14, and was the culmination of almost a century of matrimonial reforms
in British provinces. The announcement of the abolition act in 1929 before its im-
plementation had significant behavioural impact of varying intensity across British
provinces, indicating differential beliefs about the enforceability of the law. Using
this varying intensity and exploiting quasi-random variations of districts that were
former British Provinces, we show, with large-scale microdata including administra-
tive data and representative household surveys, that the reforms also had a positive
sustained impact on female education and underage marriages in post-Independent
India.
2.1 Introduction
There is an interest amongst economists about the persistent effect of British colo-
nialism in India. A number of papers have shown significant persistent negative
economic impacts (Banerjee and Iyer (2005), Iyer (2010)). This paper is the first
to examine the persistent impact of British Colonialism on gender outcomes: fe-
male education and underage marriage of girls. We show positive effects of British
colonialism on this margin.
1This chapter was written jointly with Dr. H.F. Tam.
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Gender inequality in education is part of traditional cultures in many developing
countries, where women get married earlier, are less educated and have poorer health
outcomes than men Wong (2012). Besides being a serious concern in terms of
equality of opportunity, it may also slow down economic growth (Klasen, 2002).2
Our paper investigates whether the regions of India that have historically had legal
institutions that fostered women’s rights have better gender outcomes in the modern
day. The analysis provides the basis for direct policy interventions on gender-biased
social norms and practices in society. This is the first paper, to our knowledge, that
investigates historical legal reforms to understand their long-run impact on gender
outcomes.
The paper contributes to the literature on the impact of colonial institutions on
modern day outcomes. While the literature on colonial institutions mainly focuses
on changes in modern institutions (Acemoglu et al. (2001); Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005)), our paper is closer to within country analysis, as in Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou (2013) and Dell et al. (2015), showing that modern economic outcomes
can be explained by the persistence of informal institutions. We contribute to the
literature by studying the long-run impact of colonial institutions on household
decisions on education and marriage, holding modern institutions constant. First,
we map gender inequality in terms of education and marriage in modern India to
historical political institutions. Next, we closely examine the short run and the long
run impact of legal reforms introduced in two different polities.
After England took over India in 1858, India was divided into two different
administrative institutions: the Princely States and British Provinces. This division
ceased to exist post-independence; the State Re-Organisation Act 1956 re-divided
India on the basis of linguistic identity. This led to a quasi-random distribution
of Princely States and British Provinces within each modern state that made up
independent India. Herein, we compare, within each modern state, the gender
differential human capital investment between the regions that were under direct
British rule and those that were Princely States in pre-independent India. Most of
the variations in formal institutions are at the state level in India after independence.
This implies that a comparison between regions within a state would allow us to
control for almost all differences in formal institutions. Furthermore, the re-division
of India along the lines of linguistic ethnicity allows us to further compare the
impact of colonial social reforms on groups that share very similar ethnic identities.
2(Klasen, 2002) finds that gender inequality in education is correlated with slower economic
growth, both directly by lowering average human capital, and indirectly through its impact on
investment and population growth.
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We compare gender-related outcomes between regions that were once under the
direct rule of the British, termed as British Provinces, and regions that were ruled
by hereditary Indian rulers, known as native states or Princely States. We find that
in former British Provinces, 5% fewer females marry under the current legal age of
18 years, and females have 1.6% higher chance of attending school between the ages
of 10-16 years than those in the Princely States. This shows that regions that have
different historical experiences behave differently, even after coming under the same
common law.
Our hypothesis is that the legal reforms introduced by the British rulers forcibly
changed the behaviour of the natives in the British provinces resulting in a positive
long term effect on gender equality in India today. Before examining the long term
effect of British laws, we first test the short run impact of the law using historical
data to determine whether the introduction of legal reforms in British provinces in
the past changed the behaviour of the natives in that region in the past. To exam-
ine this we use historical census data on marriage and literacy from 1911-1931 to
estimate the impact of Child Marriage Restraint Act (1929) using the difference-in-
differences strategy. The Child Marriage Restraint Act 1929, passed on 28 Septem-
ber 1929 in the British India Legislature of India, fixed the age of marriage for girls
at 14 years and boys at 18 years. It is popularly known as the Sarda Act, after its
sponsor Harbilas Sarda. It came into effect six months later on April 1, 1930 and
it applied to all of British India. This created significant incentives for families to
marry their children before April 1930. We use the Census data of 1911 to 1931 to
capture the effect of the announcement of the law, with the Princely States as our
control group. We find that announcement of the law increased the likelihood of
girls married at age 5-10 by 2.8 percentage point more among the natives in British
provinces, compared to the natives in the Princely States. Next, we look at the
long run impact of the Sarda Act. The OLS estimates of the long run impact of the
Sarda Act show that regions that were more aware of the law in 1929-1930 were less
likely to marry their girls at young age for the cohorts born in 1958-1984.
Our findings highlight the importance of understanding social background when
we think about how society responds to the development of the labour market. Social
norms in society can persist for many years and can affect the decision to partic-
ipate in education and the labour market for certain demographic groups. Even
with the same formal institutions and economic environment, a society riddled with
prejudices may not take full advantage of its economic transformation and develop-
ment. Our paper also explains a significant part of the large regional variations in
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the degree of gender bias in India. The regions that were formerly British Provinces
have better female education outcomes and fewer females marrying under the legal
age compared to former Princely State regions. This allows for both academic and
policy discussions about gender in India to go beyond geographical differences by
states or by social class. We provide some explanations regarding why such differ-
ences continue to persist, but are unable to clearly determine the impact of each
historical law. This would require a more elaborate analysis of historical data, which
we hope to accomplish in future work.
The paper is divided as follows. Historical background is provided in Section 2,
followed by a conceptual framework in Section 3. The data and empirical strategy
are described in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. The Results and Discussions are
provided in Sections 6 and 7, followed by a conclusion.
2.2 Historical Overview
The British first arrived in India through a trading company called the East India
Company. They signed their first commercial treaty in the year 1612, granted by
the Mughal Emperor Jahangir. It was not until 1757 that the British had their
first military conquest. The East India Company had experimented with a number
of political arrangements to maximise their commercial profits and minimise their
administrative liabilities. Some states were brought directly under their control and
some states entered into political and commercial treaties with the British. This
experiment came to an end with the Great Revolution of 1857, when the British
Government took control. The British divided areas under British rule into two
territories: British India and Native (or Princely) States. British India represented
all territories under the Majesty’s dominion that were ruled by the Queen through
the Governor-Generals. The Native States represented independent kingdoms of all
the Indian kings who accepted British suzerainty. They came under the governance
of the Viceroy or the Governor-General, who was the head of the administration
in India and a representative of the Monarch in India. A clear distinction between
“dominion” and “suzerainty” was supplied by the jurisdiction of the courts of law:
the laws of British India rested upon the laws passed by the British Parliament and
the legislative powers of those laws vested in the various governments of British India,
both central and local; in contrast, the courts of the Princely States existed under
the authority of the respective rulers of those states (The Interpretation Act 1889,
British Parliament). Although the East India Company enforced indirect control
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over the Princely States, the rulers of those regions were not passive figures. The
indigenous rulers had their own customs and laws which they insisted on pursuing
(Ramusack, 2004).
India became independent in 1947, at which time it was still administratively
divided into regions of British India, regions ruled by other European colonisers like
the French or Danish and the Princely States. This division rendered it difficult for
the administrators to rule the country. The State Re-Organisation Act was passed
in 1956 that re-divided India on the basis of linguistic ethnicity. This is discussed
further in the identification section.
2.2.1 Social reforms
Before the British came to administer the Indian territories, matters of marriage,
maintenance, succession and legitimacy were solved using different religious laws,
such as Dayabhaga and Mitakshara law for Hindus, literary traditions of Ithna
Ashari and Hanafi for Muslims, and several customary laws for tribal communities.
When the British took control of India, they promised not to interfere with personal
laws such as marriage, succession etc. (Carroll, 1983). However, they reserved the
right to intervene using statutory laws, which would override all religious laws in
personal matters. Social reforms that were introduced by the British depended upon
the discretion of the Governor-Generals in charge and the native social reformers
(see Chitnis and Wright (2007)). All the British reforms that were introduced by
the Governor-Generals were in direct conflict with the existing laws of Indian society
(Carroll (1983)). Most of the social reforms were not in the interest of the British, as
they created tension between the natives and their British rulers. However, the laws
were passed after much deliberation by the reformist Governor-Generals. The first
of the most important social reforms introduced in colonial India was the abolition
of Sati in 1829. Sati was only practiced by upper caste Hindus in Bengal, Rajputana
and Central India. It was a practice that involved a widow immolating herself on her
husband’s funeral pyre. The reform was pushed forward by a native social reformer,
Raja Ram Mohan Roy. Lord William Bentinck introduced this law, arguing that
the general masses of India were uncivilised and would continue this custom if the
British did not bring forward a legal reform making it a punishable offence. In a
speech in 1829, he pointed out that Britain could afford to abolish Sati without
fearing rebellion from the natives because the majority of Indian soldiers in the
British army belonged to the tribes that did not practice Sati (Fisch, 2000). Since
Sati was only practiced by few ethnic groups in India, it was possible to extend the
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law outside British jurisdictions. The British negotiated with the Princely States to
abolish Sati - Rajputana was the last native state to abolish it in 1861 (Ramusack,
2004).
Since then, most of the social reforms were implemented within British Provinces
but were not enforced in the Princely States. With the initiative of the educationalist
Pandit Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar, the British passed the Hindu Widow Remarriage
Act of 1856. Until then, widow remarriage among upper caste Hindus had been
prohibited, and Hindu widows were expected to live a life of austerity (Peers, 2013).
It was introduced with the rationale of reducing female infanticide (Law Commission,
1837) and was very unpopular among the natives. The law, however, deprived
childless widows of inheritance (Law Commission Report, 1856).
Although Sati was abolished in all of India, as a practice, it was not as widespread
as female infanticide and child marriage (Grey, 2013), which existed across all of
India and in all religions. Unlike Sati, the practice of female infanticide was not
restricted to upper caste Hindus. The abolition of female infanticide (1870) and child
marriage were harder to implement as they went directly against the widespread age-
old customs of the natives across castes and tribes (Grey, 2011). The laws related
to these practices were again confined to the British Provinces. In 1891, the Age of
Consent Law was passed that raised the age of consent to 12 years. This bill created
a lot of tension among the native population (Chitnis and Wright (2007); Ramusack
(2004)). The reforms were slow. It took the British almost forty years to pass the
Child Marriage Abolition Act (also called the Sarda Act) in 1929, which raised the
age of consent to 14 years.
In our paper, we will closely examine the impact of the Sarda Act on both
historical and modern marriage outcomes.The Child Marriage Restraint Act 1929,
passed on 28 September 1929 in the British India Legislature of India, fixed the age
of marriage for girls at 14 years and boys at 18 years. It is popularly known as the
Sarda Act, after its sponsor Harbilas Sarda.3 It came into effect six months later on
April 1, 1930 and it applied to all of British India.4 With protests from the Muslim
organisation in undivided India, a personal law called as Shariat Act was passed in
1937 that allowed child marriages among Muslims with the consent of the child’s
3Before the Sarda Act (1931), a cult group called Brahmo Samaj pioneered by Raja Ram Mohan
Roy abolished the marriage of girls below 14 years of age in 1872 under an act called as the Native
Marriage Act. But it only applied to the members of that group
4Hatekar et al. (2007) found that after the Sarda Act the probability of girls marrying below
the age of 14 years dropped dramatically among the upper caste using micro data from family
genealogies.
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guardian. Family matters were in general governed by personal religious laws such
as the Shastric law for Hindus, and Shariat law for Muslims etc. The British social
reforms mostly interfered with Hindu Shastric law, using statutory laws to override
customary religious laws (Carroll, 1983). Hence our analysis focuses on the Hindu
population of both the British provinces and the Princely States.
We compare the impact of the Sarda Act on marriages in the British Provinces
and the Princely states. However, due to paucity of census data in 1941 and 1951,
we can only analyse the effect of the announcement of the law.
In contrast to the reforms in the British Raj, there were very few gender reforms
in the Princely States. The only Princely States that implemented gender-related
reforms were the Mysore and Kathiawar Agency of Baroda. Dewan Sheadari Iyer
of Mysore in 1894 abolished the marriage of girls below the age of 8, and marriage
between girls under 16 years old to men over 50. This law was less stringent than
the British Sarda Act. In the face of widespread discontent among the masses, the
Mysore Princely State mostly implemented this reform by occasionally prosecuting
the powerless lower castes (Ramusack, 2004). The political agent, Alexander Walker,
of Kathiawar agency tried to abolish female infanticide among the Jhareja and Jetwa
tribes, with little success (Walker and Willoughby, 1856).
2.3 Conceptual framework
The social reforms implemented under the British rule in India may explain the
differences in educational outcomes between the former Princely State regions and
those that were under direct British rule, through more than one channel. We first
discuss how specific reforms in British India directly affected the decision-making
of the household, before discussing three potential mechanisms that could generate
the long-term persistence of gender inequality, years after Indian independence from
the British rule: the persistence of social norms, an information friction channel and
the impact on the re-allocation of household resources.
Early marriages bring monetary savings and reduction of effort cost to the fam-
ilies of daughters, as after marriage, they will no longer need to be taken care of
at home. If parents are happy to see their daughters married at an early age, they
may only choose to educate their daughters when the net return on education is
very high. Raising the legal age of marriage increases the total amount of time the
daughters stay at home, and thus the cost of raising them. If there exists economic
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opportunities for skilled labour, the households will have an incentive to educate
their daughters to participate in the labour market to reduce the cost of looking
after them for a prolonged period.
With the passing of the State Reorganisation Act, the Princely States and the
British Provinces came under the same jurisdiction and laws. Observed differences
in gender bias in education after this reunification could either be explained by
differences in the perceived return of education specific for female or the historical
persistence of cultural bias/dis-utility generated by female participation in activities
outside the household.
Our empirical exercise attempts to highlight that social reforms have a slow
but persistent effect. One possible explanation for the persistent gap may be due to
information friction. Correctly inferring the returns of education could be costly, and
households may only make inferences based on limited experiences of other members
of the same village. A larger initial stock of human capital among females could
help the community identify market opportunities that are suitable for females.
Thus, differences in initial human capital stock generated by historical reform in
British India could translate into differences in the perceived returns of education,
particularly when the return of human capital rose rapidly after trade liberalisation
in India.
An alternative explanation could be linked to current debates on the subject
of women empowerment (Duflo (2012) provided an in-depth discussion). Higher
female education may have a direct impact on resource allocation and decision-
making within the household (e.g. Quisumbing (1994) found that better educated
mothers invested more in girls; Breierova and Duflo (2004) found evidence of female
education on reductions in fertility and child mortality). If the mechanism holds,
an exogenous shock that increases female education would have intergenerational
persistence simply because better educated mothers allocate more resources to ed-
ucating their daughters. This intergenerational transmission mechanism will have a
larger effect if the other two mechanisms are also in operation.
With the mechanisms discussed, we test the hypothesis that regions that were
historically under British rule have better gender outcomes in the short run and
in the long run, compared to regions that were Princely States. In the following
sections, we discuss the data and empirical strategy used.
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2.4 Data
Our main source of information on the administrative division between the Princely
States and the British Raj is Baden-Powell (1892), which included a detailed map on
the division between the Princely States and areas under direct British rule together
with the year of acquisition for each district. As the landscape of the Princely States
and direct British rule was mostly settled by 1857, we define a district to be under
British direct rule according to Baden-Powell (1892), otherwise it is defined as a
Princely State. The geographical distribution is presented in Fig. 2.9.2.
Our measure of human capital investment comes from two independent sources:
District Information System for Education and the National Sample Survey. The
District Information System for Education (DISE) provides administrative records
for enrolment at the school level in India. The data is designed to cover all regions
of India in terms of the administrative information for each school in each academic
year, including the number of students of each gender enrolled and the number of
classrooms in each school. As the distinction between the Princely States and regions
of direct British rule is mostly at the district level, we aggregate the information at
the district level.5 For the analysis, we aggregate all schools in each district in terms
of the number of students enrolled in each class by gender for each year between
2005-2013; this gives us estimates of the ratio of male to female students enrolled in
each class in each academic year for 433 districts. Summary statistics are reported
in Table 2.9.1. On average, the schools in India have 9 % more boys enrolled in
Class 6 compared to girls.6
The National Sample Survey (NSS) 64-66th round (2007-2008; 2009-2010) is
another important data source that allows us to measure school attendance at the
individual level. We focus on school attendance for children aged between 10-16 years
old to study human capital investment decisions beyond basic literacy. It gives us
155,989 individual records (of 10-16 years old) regarding their principal activities
in the past 365 days, including school attendance, participation in domestic work,
and casual waged work. We report the summary statistics in Table 2.9.2 for the
sample we used. The average school attendance rate is 0.85, with, however, very
high variance.
5We excluded Karnataka in the analysis in this sample due to the lack of data availability at
the time of writing.
6This is the ratio of raw enrolment, i.e. it does not take into account the gender ratio of
the population; taking the NSS estimates of the proportion of females from 10-16 reported in
Table 2.9.2 as 0.464 (which is by itself a number that shows very high gender bias), there are 15
% more boys than girls in this age range.
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We further look into the percentage of marriages under the legal age in the
year 2006-2007 at the district level from the District Level Household and Facility
Survey (DLHS Round 3) by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare of India.
The data reported marriages under the legal age of 18 for women and recorded all
marriage ceremonies held during the three years preceding the survey, covering 570
districts.7 We use the micro data of the survey for the year 2002-2004 (DLHS Round
2) to conduct analysis with respect to Hindu female who are beyond the age of 18
at the time of interview, there are 86,214 individuals that we could merge where
they are now with the historical census data we have. In addition, we obtained the
district level GDP per capita from the Planning Commission of the Government of
India. The geographical controls, such as latitude and distance to the coast8 for
each district, are defined at the centroid of the districts.
To study the persistence of the marriage pattern and the impact of the Sarda Act
in 1929, we digitized the data from the Census of India regarding the population and
marriage status of male and females at the district level for 1901-1941, covering the
major British provinces and Princely States.9 The census data are available at ten
years interval for 1901, 1911, 1921, 1931 and 1941. We mainly limit our analysis to
the data from 1911-1931, as the data were available for all major provinces and have
consistent definition of variables across years, while in 1941 data do not exist for some
regions and the definitions are inconsistent with those reported in previous years.
There are changes in district names since the independence. To map the historical
data to modern data, we geocode the historical district name, and compute which
modern district it falls into. If more than one historical district falls into the same
district in administrative division post-independence, we associate the average of
records from the historical districts to the modern district. This maps into 126
modern districts.
It has been shown that princely states have higher levels of access to heath
centres, schools and roads compared to British provinces (Iyer (2010)). Table 2.9.3
shows the balance of economic variables between the British provinces and princely
states. We see that in the Princely States there are more households where the head
of the households are literate or completed higher education. Thus one would expect
that the Princely States will have fewer child marriages. Furthermore, Princely
states also appear to have a higher number of females and have higher income per
7The data is released through DevInfo 6.0 by UNICEF.
8Distance from the coast is the physical distance instead of travel distance.
9This includes Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Rajputana, Central Provinces, Central India Agencies,
Mysore, Travancore, Hyderabad, Ajmer and Punjab
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capita compared to British Provinces. Therefore, princely states can be expected to
have more girls going to schools. However, in our analysis that follows, we show that
British Provinces do better in terms of gender outcomes compared to the Princely
States.
Using within state variations in districts that were formerly princely states, we
show using three independent large-scale administrative data sets, that in districts
that were formerly the Princely States there is a higher rate of child marriages and
fewer girls go to school. Then, we control for several economic variables that could
explain the gender differences in schooling outcomes between the two provinces. We
hypothesize that the differences in human capital investments by gender between the
two provinces are caused by legal reforms that were introduced by British colonizers
only in the British provinces. We provide suggestive evidence of long term effect
of legal reforms by examining the Child Marriage Abolition Act (1929) on child
marriages and schooling outcomes across the two provinces.
2.5 Empirical strategy
To study the long run impact of social reforms on human capital investment, a
common challenge is to control for modern institutions and ethnicity. Different
ethnic groups may be starting with different social norms. Moreover, each ethnic
group may have different laws and social institutions that endogenously emerge
according to the customs and culture of the group. We will describe how the State
Re-Organisation Act of 1956 could help us control for both ethnicity and modern
institutions.
After independence in 1947, the State of India was divided into three main re-
gions: regions that were formerly British Provinces, regions that were under the
rule of hereditary Indian rulers, and regions that were formerly under other Eu-
ropean rulers. This division proved difficult for administrative purposes. Thus,
the government of India decided to divide India on the basis of linguistic ethnicity.
This proposal was very popular among the masses. The Telegu-speaking people
formed the state of Andhra Pradesh, Marathi-speaking people formed the state of
Maharashtra, and Kannada-speaking people formed the state of Karnataka, etc.
Linguistic ethnicity is an important determinant of identity in India. Modern
India is adversely affected by conflict and riots triggered on the basis of differences in
language. Since the 1920s, there has been conflict between Assamese and Bengali-
speaking people. In recent times, Bihari-speaking people have been targeted in
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Assam. In Maharashtra, Marathi-speaking people target migrants from Bihar and
South India. In recent times, there has been a movement towards the compulsory
use of the Marathi language in Mumbai, including in the Municipal Corporation.
(see Baruah (2003); Weiner (2015); Murthy (2006); Mitra (1995))
Therefore, each modern state in India has people speaking the same language
but with different historical experiences in terms of direct and indirect British rule.
Residents of each state were subjected to same state law after 1956; this is our
key source of identification. We argue that the distribution of Princely States and
British Provinces are quasi-random within each state. We assume that the British
did not select groups of people with a particular type of gender preferences within
ethnicities to subject them to direct British rule. People with the same ethnicity
tend to share norms. It is hard to imagine that people that were subjected to direct
British rule had systematically different gender preferences to those of the same
ethnicity living in native states at the beginning of the British India era.
In this section, we investigate the effect of Princely States (as opposed to being
directly ruled by the British) on modern gender differential human capital invest-
ment. The key differences between the two forms of control were the gender-related
social reforms that were highlighted in the historical section of this paper. However,
there are potential confounding factors, such as differences in income and geograph-
ical characteristics, which we try to control for.
We use the following specification to test the impact of the rule of Princely States
on the male/female enrolment ratio in the DISE data.
MFRsdct = α ∗ I[princelystates]sd +X ′sdξ + δs + γt + µsdt (2.1)
MFRsdct measures the ratio of male/female students enroled in class c in district
d within state s in year t. α, the coefficient of interest, captures whether in Princely
States there are systematically more male children enrolled in school. δs is the state
fixed effect that captures the systematic differences between states, such as the
gender ratio, unobserved gender bias in social norms, and the provision of schools.
X ′sd is the district level controls that include the proportion of rural schools in district
d, the average number of classrooms in schools in district d, log GDP per capita (in
2000), and latitude and distance to the coast. γt is the year fixed effect that controls
for yearly variations in gender differences in school enrolment.10
Moreover, we use the following specification to test the impact of the rule of
10All standard errors are clustered at district level
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Princely States on school attendance and participation in waged work of women
aged 10-16 years in 2006-2010 using the NSS data.
ysdi = β∗I[princelystates]sd∗femalei+γs+φs∗femalesdi+X ′sdiη+D′sdσ+sdi (2.2)
Where ysdi is an indicator of school attendance/participation in waged work
11
as the principal activity in the 365 days before individual i in state s of district d
was interviewed. I[princelystates]sd is a district level indicator of whether district
d in state s belonged to a Princely State. The coefficient of interest is β, which is
the coefficient for interaction term between I[princelystates]sd and femalei, which
is a female dummy variable for person i. This captures whether females do worse in
Princely States compared to direct British-ruled regions. γs is the state fixed effect
for school attendance that captures state level differences in school attendance, such
as different levels of provisions of schools. φs is a state-specific female fixed effect.
This state-specific female fixed effect would mostly capture the different degrees of
gender bias that exist in different states, which could be attributed to differences
in gender norms between different ethnicities or differences in the labour market
return of females. Xsdi is a set of socioeconomic controls that include the age of
the child, the age of the head of the household, and the square of the age of the
household head, an indicator for Muslim, Christian and other religions, an indicator
of rural areas, and an indicator of the landownership of the households. Dsd is the
geographic controls for district d in state s, which includes latitude and distance to
the coast.
Moreover, we use the district level aggregate of the District Level Household and
Facility survey to test the impact of Princely State’s rule on the number of girls that
marry under the legal age. We estimate the following equation:
Msd = σ ∗ I[princelystates]sd +X ′sdΦ + κs + τsd (2.3)
Msd is a continuous measure of the percentage of marriages under the legal age
in 2006-2007 for district d in state s, σ is the coefficient of interest as it tells us
whether in former Princely State regions, more marriage are carried out under the
legal age. Xsd is the district level controls that include latitude, distance to the
coast and log GDP per capita (in 2000). κs is the state-fixed effect which controls
for systematic differences across the states.
11This includes casual wage labor and not regular salaried work, and should be more relevant
for the age range in our sample
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2.5.1 Response to Sarda Act
In this paper we argue that British legal reforms affected the behaviour of the natives
in British provinces by abolishing their traditional customs. To show the impact of
the British legal reforms on the behavior of the natives, we begin with the study of
the effects of the Sarda Act, the child marriage abolition law in 1929-1930. Fig. 2.9.3
plot the percentage of male/female married in the age group of 5-10 and 10-15 from
1901-1931 for the whole of India. The marriage pattern were stable from 1901-1921,
while in 1931 the proportion of females married increase dramatically for all young
age groups, particularly among the female. This is most likely due to the anticipation
effect in the six months between its announcement and implementation (Census of
India 1931). Fig. 2.9.4 shows the geographical distribution for the proportion of
female married at age 5-10 in 1921, as well as the change from 1921-1931. It is
not clear that places that experienced the highest increase in child marriage in
1931 were those that traditionally practiced child marriage in most numbers. Using
historical census data, we estimate the following equation to test whether historical
institutions explains the change in marriage pattern from 1921 to 1931.
Mpdt = α ∗ I[Britishdirectrule]pd ∗ I[t = 1931] + γp ∗ t+ φt + σd + τpdt (2.4)
Mpdt is the percentage of female who already got married at the age 5-10 in dis-
trict d of pre-independent province p (i.e. political division before State-Reorganization
Act) in year t between 1911-1931.12 I[Britishdirectrule] is an indicator which equals
1 if the district were under British direct rule.13 α captures the differential changes
in marriage pattern from 1921 to 1931 between former British direct rule regions and
Princely States. Assuming there is no other factors that affect marriage pattern of
the two regions differently between 1921-1931, α identify the effect of anticipation of
actual implementation of the law. We control for the province specific trend (γp ∗ t),
district fixed effect (σd ) and year fixed effect (φt).
2.5.2 Long run impact of Sarda Act
In this section we test the hypothesis that the awareness of the Sarda Act has long
run impact on female marriage and education outcome, as measured in the DLHS
12It is defined as the number of married female at age 5-10 divided by the total number of female
at age 5-10, reported by the Census
13so I[Britishdirectrule] = 1 − I[princelystates], the variables we used in the specification
described earlier
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2002 for Hindu female aged above 18.
The equation of interest would be
ysdi = βLsd + β2Msd,1921 +X
′
sdiσ + sdi (2.5)
ysdi are outcome variables measured in DLHS in 2002, for individual female i in
state s, district d. It includes outcomes for marriage and education: indicator of
marrying below the age of 14, marrying in the age range of 14-17, indicator for any
level of schooling. Lsd is a measure of awareness of the Sarda Act for district d in
state s since 1929. If the awareness of the Sarda Act reduces the probability of early
marriage for female and increases the educational outcomes for females in the long
run, we expect β to be positive. β2 captures the accumulative effect of traditions
and historical reforms before 1921 that could explains outcome in 2002.
Without a direct measure of Lsd, we use the proportional increase in the mar-
riage ratio among girls aged 5-10, msd =
Msd,1931−Msd,1921
Msd,1921
as proxy, and estimate the
following equation
ysdi = η ∗msd + γMsd,1921 +X ′sdiσ + µsdi (2.6)
Msd,1921 and Msd,1931 are the percentage of female who already got married at
the age 5-10 in district d of state s in year 1921 and 1931 respectively, constructed
by mapping new districts with their historical counterparts.
Given the historical context, msd should be positively related to Lsd, in the sense
that in the districts with higher awareness of the law, more females in age range
of 5-10 would be married as measured in 1931. This implies that η in equation 2.6
would have the same sign of the effect of β in equation 2.5.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 DISE
The OLS results for 2.1 of school enrolment are presented in Table 2.9.4. Column 1
reports the estimates for equation 1 for the ratio of gross enrolment of boys to girls in
Class 6; the coefficient suggests that on average there are 2 percentage point more
boys enrolled in schools than girls in former Princely States versus British-ruled
regions. The availability of larger schools measured by the number of classrooms
predicts lower boy to girl enrolment ratio. We also included log GDP per capita to
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control for the provision of schools and household budget constraints across districts
within the same state, however, it is only marginally significant. Column 2 reports
the same measure for Class 5, where the coefficient is very small and insignificant;
this suggests that the results in Column 1 are mainly due to the dropping out of
girls in higher grades rather than being driven by the differences in the gender ratio.
Girls reach the age of 12 when they reach Class 8. Older girls may be more useful
for household domestic work for which parents might take them out of school. If a
community thinks that return of education of girls are low, then it is less likely for
the community to invest in secondary schooling of girls.
In Table 2.9.5, we report Eq. (2.1) estimated by each class from 1 to 8. Comparing
across columns, it is clear that the gender enrolment ratio only starts differing at
Classes 6, 7 and 8, at which time the decision to attend school is more closely related
to a human capital investment decision beyond basic literacy. The magnitudes of the
coefficients across Columns 6, 7, and 8 are quite consistent at around 2-3 percentage
point, suggesting that Class 6 is a critical time when, if girls drop out of school,
they may not return, whereas those that stay in education are likely to proceed
with similar probability to boys.
2.6.2 NSS
Table 2.9.6 reports the estimates of equation 2 on the main activities of children
aged 10-16 years from the NSS data. Columns (1)-(2) report the estimates for
school attendance, Columns (3)-(4) report the estimates for participation in waged
work, and Columns (5)-(6) report participation in domestic work. The estimated
interaction term Princely States*female is significant for school attendance, which
shows that girls in Princely States are 1.6 % less likely to attend school compared to
girls in British-ruled regions within the same modern state. We do not see similar
significances in other outcome variables once we include the state female fixed effect
to control for gender bias at the state level. The main effect of the Princely State for
paid work participation (Columns (3) and (4)) is only significant when we exclude
the interaction term with females, and the magnitude is small (0.5 % difference in
the probability of market participation between Princely States and British-ruled
regions). This could potentially be explained either by the lower age of marriage in
Princely States or a small difference in the availability of market work.
However, our estimates on school attendance cannot be solely driven by the
availability of market work. We further report estimates of Eq. (2.2) by Hindus
and Muslims, as the historical overview section has shown that there were stark
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differences in how Hindus and Muslims responded to the social reforms in British-
ruled regions. Column (1) in Table 2.9.7 reports the estimate for Hindus only. The
coefficient is highly significant with a magnitude higher than that in the sample
including all religions - females among the Hindu population are 2.1 % less likely to
attend school in former Princely States, greater than the equivalent estimate of 1.6
% for the whole population. Moreover, the main coefficient of the Princely States is
positive and is marginally significant for Hindus, which means that males are more
likely to attend school in Princely States - this supports the hypothesis that the
fundamental cause of the observed difference is driven by the persistence of cultural
practices rather than the availability of education. On the other hand, the same
estimate for Muslims in Column (2), despite its smaller sample size, is not only
statistically insignificant but the sign of Princely States*female turns positive with
a very large standard error. Instead of explaining the difference by time invariant
inherent cultural differences between Hindus and Muslims, we tend to associate this
difference in our estimates by how cultures interact with the implementation of the
law in British-ruled regions before Independence.
In Fig. A2 we plot the percentage of married female at age 10-15 for districts
that now belong to Madhya Pradesh - there were historically huge differences in how
Hindus and Muslims responded to the Sarda Act of 1929 and Age of Consent Law
of 1891.
2.6.3 Marriage under legal age
Table 2.9.8 reports estimates of Eq. (2.3) using the district level aggregate of the
percentage of marriages under the legal age for females in 2006-2007. The coefficients
estimated are positive, highly significant and robust upon inclusion of log GDP
per capita (Column (1) and (2)). Our estimates suggest that Princely States have
approximately 5 percentage points more marriages under the legal age for females.
In Column (3) and (4), we report the results using the mean age of marriage in
2002-2004 as an outcome variable; it can be seen that districts formerly belonging
to Princely States have a lower mean age of marriage by 0.4 years. An average of
22.66 % of all marriages in India take place under the legal age for female14; our
estimated 5 percentage points difference between Princely States and direct British-
ruled regions explains a significant number of underage marriages in India.
14From our district level aggregate not weighted by population share in each districts
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2.6.4 Sarda Act using Census Data 1911-1931
Above we provide a mapping of gender inequality to different political institutions.
In this section we focus on the impact of the legal reforms under two different
political rule that affected behaviour in the past.
The estimates for equation 2.4 are presented in Table 2.9.9. The coefficient of
Princely states*1931 is statistically significant in column (2) where we control for
province specific trend. The coefficient estimate is 2.8, which shows that among girls
aged between 5-10, there are on average 2.8 percentage points more girls among na-
tives in British provinces who got married in 1931. The natives in British provinces
feared the implementation of the act in the coming months and millions of girls
under the age of 14 were married off. This result is also well documented in the
census reports of the British. The Sarda Act applied to only British India, however
in Princely States such as Mysore and Baroda also tried to enact laws abolishing
child marriages. 15 We observe a slight bunching in female child marriages in the
Princely States, but in British provinces it is on average more severe.
Compare to column (1), which we did not include province specific trend, the
coefficient in column (2) is more significant and with a larger magnitude, this sug-
gesting that provinces may have differential trends before 1931.
Table 2.9.10 reports the estimates for equation 2.6, in OLS . Column (1) and (2)
report the estimates for the outcome of marrying below 14 and marrying between
14-17 respectively, where the coefficients for Msd,1921 is statistically significant, sug-
gesting that the historical marriage pattern does explain the probability of marrying
below 14 for the cohort of 18-44 years old in 2002. The estimate for Msd,1921 in col-
umn (3) for the OLS is 0.176, which could be interpreted as 10 percentage point
increase in the proportion of females married at the age of 5-10 in 1921 predicts a
1.76 percentage higher probability of a girl marrying below the legal age in 2002.
The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that a significant part of child marriage
in India has a very strong historical roots, going far beyond 1921.
Moreover, the estimates for msd is negative and statistically significant in column
(1)-(2). It shows that one percentage point increase in the proportion of female
married in 1931 (between 5-10) predict a smaller probability of a girl getting married
below legal age post-independence. With the assumption that an increase in child
15Mysore in 1894 abolished child marriage below the age of 8. Many reformers from Mysore who
pushed for the legislation of the Sarda Act could not raise the age of marriage for girls in Mysore.
Therefore, in Mysore there was a weak form of child marriage restraint reform.
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marriage in 1931 proxy for a high awareness of the Sarda Act, the estimate provide
evidence that the Sarda Act reduced child marriages in the long run. Column (3)
report estimate for the outcome of school attendance for girls. We find that 1 %
increase in proportion of girls married at the age 5-10 from 1921-1931 predicts a
0.77% higher chance of females getting some education in 2002.
In column (4)-(6) we further control for state fixed effect. The coefficient for
msd, 1921 and Msd,1921 becomes smaller in general, but remains significant and the
same signs in predicting marriage pattern in post-independence period. Controlling
for state fixed-effects, we find that 1 % more girls married at the age 5-10 in 1921
predicts a 10% lower chance of females getting at least some education measured in
2002, while the coefficient of msd, 1921 remains positive but not significant.
We find regions that experienced bunching of marriages in 1931 have fewer girls
marrying below legal age and are more likely to have experienced schooling post-
independence, controlling for cultural variation across regions up to 1921. One
interpretation of this long run effect could be that in British provinces the natives
anticipated the implementation of the law in 1931 and did not wish to get affected
by it. Therefore, the generation most affected by the Sarda Act and it’s the later
generations are more likely to conform their behaviour to any new law. This may
explain why regions that got affected by legal reforms imposed by a foreign admin-
istrative body behave differently than regions that are culturally similar but did not
get affected by the reform.
2.7 Discussion and robustness check
2.7.1 Robustness check - Princely States that potentially
underwent reform
As discussed in the previous section, it was documented that in two of the Princely
States (Mysore and the Kathiawar Agency of Baroda), there were reforms related
to child marriages independent of similar reforms in the British Provinces. In the
previous section, where we estimated Eq. (2.2) and Eq. (2.3) (school attendance in
NSS and marriage under the legal age), we did not exclude Mysore and the Kathi-
awar Agency of Baroda because their implementation is weak from the historical
description. We present the estimates for Eq. (2.2) and Eq. (2.3), excluding these
two Princely States as a robustness check, in Table A1 and Table A2.
In Table A1, we report the estimates for school attendance in the NSS data
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excluding Mysore and Kathiawar Agency of Baroda in Column (2). The coefficient
of the Princely States indicator increases slightly from 1.6 to 1.8, which implies a
bigger difference in female school attendance among 10-16 years old between the
Princely States and the British Provinces. Similarly, in Table A2 we report the
estimates of equation Eq. (2.3) for the percentage of marriages under the legal age
and the mean age of marriage, excluding Mysore and Baroda. The coefficients again
increased slightly upon the exclusion of the two districts (in Columns (2) and (4)),
which is what one would expect if Mysore and Baroda had weak social reforms that
were similar in nature to those in the British Provinces.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper we show that two regions that have had different legal reforms in
the past behave differently when placed under the same modern institution. In
particular we find that girls are more likely to go to school in regions that have had
gender reforms in the past. If two regions are given the same opportunities in terms
of provision of schools, we argue that the region that has had gender related legal
reforms will have more females exploiting the opportunities. Our findings support
policy intervention that eliminates prejudice behaviour by showing its positive long
term impact. Providing infrastructure by the social planner might not be enough
for economic growth, we also need to change the bottlenecks on the demand side.
103
2.9 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.9.1: Timeline of key historical events
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Figure 2.9.2: Distribution of Princely States and British direct rule regions
Note: The shaded parts were districts that belonged to Princely States and the white parts are
districts that were under British direct rule.
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Figure 2.9.3: Marriage pattern in 1929-1930: time series
The graph plots the proportion of children married in each Census year, by gender and
age group, for India as a whole.
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Figure 2.9.4: Girls married 5-10 (%), all religion: Original 1931 administrative
division
(a) Girls married 5- 10 (%): 1921
(b) ∆ Girls married 5- 10 (%): 1931- 1921
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Table 2.9.1: Summary statistics of the DISE data
mean sd
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 1 1.079 0.093
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 2 1.070 0.099
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 3 1.068 0.107
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 4 1.069 0.115
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 5 1.076 0.130
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 6 1.088 0.157
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 7 1.094 0.176
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 8 1.103 0.195
Distance to coast 475.330 332.864
Proportion of rural schools 0.885 0.129
Princely states 0.261 0.439
Number of classrooms 4.418 1.778
Observations 2749
Number of districts 433
Note: Data aggregated at district level from DISE school records, forming a district level (un-
balanced) panel for 2005-2013; Kerala not in the sample; Princely states is a {0,1} indicator.
Distance to coast measured in kilometers from the centroid of each district.








Head complete primary 0.304
Head complete secondary 0.133
Head complete higher than secondary 0.185
Land ownership 0.895
Observations 155989
Note: Sample includes children in the NSS 64th and 66th round who aged 10-16 at the time
of interview. School attendance is an {0,1} indicator for whether the principal activities in
the past year of the child were attending school. Head literate, Head complete primary, Head
complete secondary, Head complete higher than secondary were indicators for the education
level of the household head, with base group illiterate. Land ownership is an {0,1} indicator
for whether the household owns any land.
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Table 2.9.3: Summary statistics - Princely States versus British Provinces
British Provinces Princely states
mean mean
Princely states 0 1
Minimum distance to french port 634.3 784.3
Minimum distance to portuguese port 1134.1 1082.0
Distance to coast 477.9 357.7
Ln GDPPC (2000) 2.583 2.872
Manufacturing share of GDP (2000) 0.110 0.0821
Observations 291 98





Owns Land .89 .90
Observations 96,994 53,090
Head of Household literate( yes=1) .708 .747
Head of Household primary edu( yes=1) .301 .304
Head of Household secondary edu( yes=1) .129 .136
Head of Household higher edu( yes=1) .174 .203
Observations 43,215 24,080
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 6 1.089 1.109
Total boy / total girl enrollment in class 5 1.079 1.090
Proportion of rural schools 0.887 0.847
Number of classrooms 4.402 5.203
Observations 2225 960
Note: Sample includes children in the NSS 64th and 66th round who aged 10-16 at the time
of interview. School attendance is an {0,1} indicator for whether the principal activities in
the past year of the child were attending school. Head literate, Head complete primary, Head
complete secondary, Head complete higher than secondary were indicators for the education
level of the household head, with base group illiterate. Land ownership is an {0,1} indicator
for whether the household owns any land.Data aggregated at district level from DISE school
records, forming a district level (unbalanced) panel for 2005-2013; Kerala not in the sample;
Princely states is a {0,1} indicator. Distance to coast measured in kilometers from the centroid
of each district.
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Table 2.9.4: OLS Regression of Boy / Girl enrolment ratio at class 5/6: 2005-2013
Outcome: Ratio of boy/girl enrolment
Class 6 Class 5
(1) (2)
Princely states 0.0201∗∗ 0.00839
(0.00993) (0.00722)
Number of classrooms -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0131∗∗∗
(0.00565) (0.00476)
Ln GDPPC (2000) -0.0303∗ -0.0176
(0.0166) (0.0132)
Observations 2749 2749
State FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
Note: Standard errors clustered at district level; The outcome variable is ratio of number of boys
enrolled to the number of girls enrolled in each district, year and class, from 2005-2013; Other
controls include latitude and distance to coast; Ln GDP per capita measured are district level


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.9.8: Marriage under legal age and mean age of marriage
Outcome: % under legal age Mean age of marriage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Princely states 5.186∗∗∗ 5.018∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗
(1.361) (1.369) (0.147) (0.149)
Distance to coast -0.0141∗∗∗ -0.0136∗∗∗ 0.000601 0.000172
(0.00518) (0.00512) (0.000586) (0.000529)
Latitude 1.119∗∗ 0.967∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.0910∗
(0.523) (0.514) (0.0572) (0.0514)
Ln GDPpc 2000 -11.91∗∗∗ 1.192∗∗∗
(1.644) (0.164)
Observations 568 508 570 508
mean 22.66 23.74 19.44 19.21
State FE Y Y Y Y
Note: Sample include percentage of marriage under legal age for female*100 reported of each
districts, recorded from District Level Household and Facility Survey in 2006-2007 (from Dev-
Info 3.0); Mean age of marriage are district level mean age of marriage from DLHS 2002-2004
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A1: Geographical distribution of birth place of Pro-Sarda Act reformers
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Figure A2: Percentage of married female - 10-15 years old - Madhya Pradesh
(a) All religion
(b) Hindu - Muslim
Note: Data from Census of India 1891-1931 and cover Central Provinces and Central India
Agencies which belongs to Madhya Pradesh today; the red line denotes the enactment of the
Sarda Act.
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Table A1: Robustness check - exclusion of Mysore and Baroda: NSS Education
School School
(1) (2)
Princely states=1 0.00601 0.00556
(0.00580) (0.00580)
Princely states=1 × Female=1 -0.0160∗∗ -0.0186∗∗∗
(0.00630) (0.00650)
Observations 150084 146074
Include Mysore and Baroda Y N
Note: Sample includes children in the NSS 64th and 66th round who aged 10-16 at the time of
interview; Specification same as in Table 2.9.6.
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Table A2: Robustness check - exclusion of Mysore and Baroda: Marriage
outcome: % under legal age mean age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Princely states 5.018∗∗∗ 6.067∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗ -0.375∗∗
(1.369) (1.367) (0.149) (0.151)
Distance to coast -0.0136∗∗∗ -0.0121∗∗ 0.000172 0.000217
(0.00512) (0.00516) (0.000529) (0.000532)
Latitude 0.967∗ 0.633 -0.0910∗ -0.0896
(0.514) (0.529) (0.0514) (0.0550)
Ln GDPpc 2000 -11.91∗∗∗ -11.75∗∗∗ 1.192∗∗∗ 1.190∗∗∗
(1.644) (1.668) (0.164) (0.167)
Observations 508 496 508 496
Include Mysore and Baroda Y N Y N
Note: Sample include percentage of marriage under legal age for female*100 reported of each
districts, recorded from District Level Household and Facility Survey in 2006-2007 (from Dev-
Info 3.0); Mean age of marriage are district level mean age of marriage from DLHS 2002-2004





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Gender Bias in Education during
Conflict: Evidence from Assam1
Using a large-scale novel panel dataset (2005-14) on schools from the Indian state
of Assam, we test for the impact of violent conflict on female student’s enrolment
rates. We find that a doubling of average killings in a district-year leads to a 13 per
cent drop in girl’s enrolment ratio with school fixed effects. Results remain similar
when using an alternative definition of conflict from a different dataset. Gender dif-
ferential responses are more negative for lower grades, rural schools, poorer districts,
and for schools run by local and private unaided bodies.
3.1 Introduction
Two billion people live in countries where development outcomes are affected by
fragility, conflict, and violence (World Bank, 20162). The effect of such fragility on
educational attainment is generally harmful. This is not only likely to lead to lower
growth in the future but may keep countries trapped in conflict. Although existing
political and social institutions are unusual under stress during civil conflict, little
is known about what resources can be supplied to existing schools during violent
times to help wither the debilitating effects of violence.
The United Nations Millennium Development Goals have emphasized reducing
schooling gender gaps since 2000 (United Nations, 20093). Even as Latin America
and Southeast Asia have made tremendous progress towards eliminating gender gaps
1This paper was coauthored with Dr. Prakarsh Singh
2World Bank. 2016. Helping Countries Navigate a Volatile Environment.
3United Nations. 2009. The Millennium Development Goals Report, 2009. New York: United
Nations.
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in educational attainment, the biggest room for improvement is in South Asia and
West/Central Africa (Grant and Behrman (2010)). One hypothesis for the slower
convergence in these regions is exposure to conflict by families residing in conflict-
prone regions combined with an intrinsic bias towards investing in sons’ education
at the cost of daughters. The entrenched gender norms interact with a scarcity of
resources to reduce school enrolment for girls. However, in Rwanda Akresh (2008)
found that school-age boys and girls exposed to conflict have 0.5 and 0.3 fewer
years of schooling, respectively. They argue that conflict disproportionately affects
boys who had previously enjoyed an advantage in terms of education. Although
the overall evidence on the impact of civil conflict on gender disparities in educa-
tional attainment is mixed, there has been little effort to analyze the supply-side
factors (such as schooling inputs) that could help cushion shocks that lead to such
distortions in investment decisions.
The conflict literature has transitioned from understanding cross-country corre-
lations to a micro-level analysis of violence. By addressing reverse causality and
omitted variables bias, these studies have contributed towards a deeper understand-
ing of the consequences of civil conflict. Moreover, in recent years, the nature of
armed conflict around the globe has shifted from civil wars and large-scale conflicts
to more localized insurgencies. In this paper, we use school-level variation over time
and regions in the north-east Indian state of Assam to uncover district-level effects
of violence on girl’s enrolment ratios.
Internal conflict imposes significant costs in terms of life and property. However,
there may also be distortions to long-term investments due to conflict.4 These
distortions may include forgoing education or health investments if resources become
more limited. The negative effects may be even larger for sub-groups that are either
discriminated against or are of less economic value. Although gender inequality in
education is a serious concern in and of itself, as it precludes girls from achieving
equal opportunities, it could also lead to lower economic growth in the long run. For
example, Klasen (2002) finds that gender inequality in education is correlated with
lower economic growth, directly by reducing average human capital and indirectly
through its impact on investment and population growth.5
4Blattman and Miguel (2010) find that one of the ways in which conflict depletes capital is
through a massive flight of mobile forms of capital, possibly leading to low levels of new investment.
In low-income countries, civil war makes poverty reduction and growth difficult to achieve (Murshed
(2002), Verwimp et al. (2009) note the importance of taking the interaction between the armed
actors and the households and individuals in affected communities seriously when studying violent
conflict.
5Similarly, Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray (2015) demonstrate that gender inequality in
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By compiling conflict data over the period 2000-14 across 22 districts in Assam,
we test for the gender-differential impact of conflict on educational outcomes using
a difference-in-differences approach with school, block, or district, and year fixed
effects. Second, due to availability of detailed school-level data through the District
Information System for Education (DISE) surveys, we test how resources for schools
interact with intensity of conflict to affect enrolment for girls versus boys. Resources
may be private or public and may be used to improve teacher–pupil ratios or in-
frastructure, through building new classrooms, equipping existing classrooms with
blackboards, or stocking libraries.
Conflict’s effect on education is understudied primarily due to a lack of available
data from households in conflict-affected regions. Moreover, even if the data is
available, it is often of very poor quality and households are not representative of
the entire population. Moreover, household surveys do not allow us to consider a
region-wide impact due to problems with agglomeration when using a small non-
representative sample. Second, there may be spillovers on households not surveyed
that may affect the biasedness of our estimates. For example, some households may
decide to stop sending children to school in response to conflict and this may open up
spaces for other households to send their children to school. Indeed the “treatment
effect on the treated” is likely to be different from the “intention to treat” effect when
considering consequences of civil conflict. Most reports on the consequences of civil
wars on educational attainment for girls are case studies. However, recent empirical
research in the area has found mixed evidence. Parents differentially invest in a son’s
secondary education as opposed to a daughter’s depending on the context of conflict,
and the intensity and nature of recruitment by rebel groups. Decline in women’s
educational attainment in war-torn societies has been observed in Chamarbagwala
and Mora´n (2011), Shemyakina (2011) and Singh and Shemyakina (2016). However,
Swee et al. (2009) and Kecmanovic (2013) find lower levels of education among the
cohort of young males affected by war due to their participation in the conflict.6
primary and secondary education has a negative effect on income.
6Exposure to genocide in Rwanda resulted in a drop in educational achievement of schooling
for all children but the impact was higher for boys from non-poor families (Akresh (2008)). In
Nepal, educational attainment of girls who were of school age during the Maoist conflict actually
increased (Valente (2013).
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3.1.1 Background of conflict in Assam
The Indian state of Assam is located in the country’s northeast and shares an in-
ternational border with Bhutan and Bangladesh.7 Assam has been mired in ethnic
conflict since 1979, primarily between the Bodos (an ethnic tribe) and Muslim im-
migrants from Bangladesh. Illegal migration into Assam from Bangladesh during
its independence movement in 1971 led to competition for resources and jobs in the
region. The lack of economic opportunities for young males instigated the formation
of militant groups. The large influx of (primarily) Muslim immigrants was a threat
to the Bodos, who have sustained their community through agriculture for decades
(Bhattacharjee and Phukan 2012)8. ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam) was
formed in 1979 under the leadership of Paresh Barua, with the aim of bringing
about Assam’s political separation from India, largely supported by the indigenous
Bodo population. Its demands included detection of illegal immigrants, deletion of
immigrants’ names from voters’ list, which effectively revoked their political power.
When the government did not accede to their demands, ULFA targeted economically
wealthy districts, abducted prominent businessmen, attacked politicians and civil-
ians. Several militant outfits, such as the National Democratic Front of Bodoland,
Bodo Liberation Tigers, and the Adivasi National Liberation Army sprang up in
the 1980s.
Riots and violence between Bodos and non-Bodos have been sporadic but persis-
tent. In recent years violent incidents have increased; one riot that erupted in 2012
killed 77 people (Asian Centre for Human Rights 20129). Apart from fighting over
resources and land, the Bodos under militant outfits have consistently expressed
discontent with the state’s policies (Goswami (2001)). Over time, different tribal
factions of Assam have unsuccessfully demanded autonomy from the Indian govern-
ment.10 A recent successful attempt to evict illegal settlers by the government from
protected forests provided a boost to the militant Bodo movement. For example,
in the district of Kokrajhar, the Bodo heartland, Muslim migrants are regularly
attacked by Bodo separatist rebels (Bhaumik 201211).
7Assam has a population of 31 million with an area of 30,285 square miles (Census of India,
2011).
8“Assam Violence: A History of Conflict Rooted in Land.” NDTV
9Asian Centre for Human Rights. 2012. National Commission for Minorities: Communalising
Assam Riots.)
10The worst violence prompted by such tensions erupted during a controversial election in Febru-
ary 1983-nearly 3,000 people were left dead in that episode. After the 1983 elections, the state
government tried to placate the rebels by signing an accord with the All Assam Students Union
(AASU) in 1985, which was leading the campaign against the migrants. However, even though
this was accepted by the moderate wing of the Bodos, the extremists opposed the accord.
11Bhaumik, S. 2012. What Lies behind Assam Violence? BBC News, 26 July.
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The conflict data is a district-level panel for 14 years from 2000 to 2014, collated
from the South Asia Terrorism Portal’s (SATP’s) list of all conflict events in South
Asia. We employ two main indicators of violence for our regressions: total killed in
violent incidents in a district-year, and total killed or injured in a district-year. The
incidents have been coded manually from their “all events”, which is based on news
reports and may be susceptible to measurement error. However, as long as the error
is not systematically correlated with educational variables, there should be no bias.
From Table 3.8.1, we find that violent conflict increases sharply in the years
2007-9 and again from 2012-14 and an average district in Assam is exposed to half
as many incidents in the intervening period (2010-11). For example, in the year
2008, for the 22 districts in total, each district on average had 26 killings due to the
conflict. The non-monotonicity in conflict is important for testing a causal channel
between conflict and education. Military technology used by militants includes
rocket launchers, grenades, ammunition, bombs, detonators, and M16 rifles. They
appear to largely target businessmen and their family members and carry out their
kidnappings for extortion. Along with extortion, there appears to be an upswing in
the targeting of civilians such as doctors and forest personnel from the SATP data.
In Table 3.8.2, we show the variation in conflict across districts. Some districts,
such as Karbi Anglong, Kokrajhar and Tinsukia suffer more than 20 civilian casu-
alties on average every year between 2000 and 2014 due to violence. Others, such
as, Karimganj, Hailakandi and Marigaon have relatively low levels of violence. Part
of the reason could be that larger districts such as Karbi Anglong (population and
area wise) would automatically be more prone to such incidents (just as population
is a significant predictor of conflict onset in cross-country regressions, for example
in Collier and Hoeﬄer 1998). Similarly, some districts may be more conducive to
insurgencies because of their terrain. Forested areas could provide hiding space
for militants. This is also a pattern seen in cross-country correlations (Fearon and
Laitin 2003). Fig. 3.7.1 illustrates the high-conflict districts in the reddish spectrum
whereas greener districts have lower levels of conflict from 2000 to 2014. Every dis-
trict was affected by conflict over the time period. To control for larger districts
having more violent incidents, or districts having more conflict because of their geog-
raphy and proximity to an international border, we will include district fixed effects
in our set of controls.
Fig. 3.7.2 shows the dynamics of conflict in each district. We observe that dis-
tricts follow one of three patterns: first, there are several districts that have low
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conflict throughout the period 2000-14 (for example, Hailakandi, Jorhat, Lakhim-
pur, Marigaon, Nagaon). Second, there are districts that show high levels of violence
in the early years but declining conflict in later years (Karbi Anglong, Tinsukia, Nal-
bari). Finally, there are a few districts that show an increase in the incidence of
violence over time (Kokrajhar, Goalpara, Bongaigaon).
3.1.2 Gender inequality in education in Assam
Among all states in India, the social status of women was found to be the poorest
in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, and Bihar (Planning Commission 200712). In India’s
northeastern region, Assam ranks below the national average in terms of gender
development index.13 The gender gap in literacy is lower in the northeastern region
than the rest of India. Over time, the literacy gender gap has narrowed down for all
states except for Assam. In Assam the literacy gap has widened and the schooling
enrolment gap by gender still persists in high schools.14 Mahanta and Nayak (2013)
find a greater gender gap in the enrolment ratio of grades 1 to 5 as compared to
grades 6–7 over the period 1999 to 2010. This gap is highest for Assam (18.89 per
cent) and lowest for Sikkim (0.84 per cent) among northeastern states. The figures
are still above the national average.
In Fig. 3.7.3, we see girl’s enrolment patterns over time in the different districts.
We observe the following three patterns despite a positive overall time trend for
nearly all districts: first, there are districts that have both high levels of girl’s
enrolment ratio as well as low levels of conflict (for example, Marigaon and Nagaon).
Second, some districts have middling levels of conflict but vary in their trend of girl’s
enrolment (for example, stagnant and low enrolment in Sibsagar; sharply increasing
in Darrang). Third, districts with high conflict show fluctuations in enrolment ratio
(Dhubri, Karbi Anglong, Tinsukia). In order to find if these variations correlate
with variations in violence, we need to run regressions across and within districts.
Another way of illustrating the state of and trends in gender inequality in As-
samese schools could be by looking at the supply-side. Fig. 3.7.4 graphs the ratio of
female to male teachers by district (2005-14). We find that, interestingly, districts
with higher ratios of female to male teachers are usually the ones with low levels of
girl’s enrolment (Dibrugarh, Tinsukia, Golaghat, and Sibsagar). Similarly, several
12Planning Commission. 2007. Functioning and Performance of Swashakti and Swayamsiddha
Programme in India
13Life expectancy at birth, of women in Assam is 58.1 years, lower than the national average at
63.3 years Mahanta and Nayak (2013)
14See Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for details
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districts with lower ratios of female to male teachers had higher levels of girl’s enrol-
ment (Marigaon, Nagaon, Goalpara, and Barpeta). Thus, it is not straightforward
to assume that gender inequality in educational enrolment across districts corre-
sponds also to gender imbalance in teacher’s employment across the same districts.
Yet it may be the case that by increasing recruitment of female teachers in schools,
the negative effects of conflict on gender balance are restrained. We test for this
hypothesis in our policy recommendations section.
3.2 Data and empirical strategy
In the school-level dataset (2005-14), we have access to a rich set of variables. The
data is collected by DISE at the school level (grades 1-8) for every village in all dis-
tricts of Assam.15 All schools falling under the Department of Education, tribal or
social welfare department, local body, private aided, private unaided, and madras-
sas16 are supposed to be covered under DISE. Most children who attend these grades
would be in the age range of 6-14 years. Some of the variables at the school level
include the type of management (as specified above), year of establishment, funds
available for the school and the nature of funds, number of teaching staff and stu-
dents, qualifications of teaching staff, and enrolment ratios of the students by grade,
caste, tribe, and gender. We also know the number of students who repeat their
grades by gender and grade, and presence of school facilities such as a library, black-
board, toilets, and computer facilities. This is an unbalanced panel at the school
level with the average school being repeatedly surveyed 5.9 times.
We show some of the baseline means for schooling inputs by high- and low-conflict
districts in Table 3.8.3. The districts are classified depending on whether their aver-
age annual killings are greater than or equal to the median or less than the median
for the time period under consideration (2005-14). Girl’s enrolment ratio at baseline
is similar across low- and high-conflict districts. Several indicators, such as library
books, male teachers, total children, total boys, and total girls are balanced between
high- and low-conflict districts. However, there are significantly fewer computers in
high-conflict district schools, which may also be related to lower funds available
from grants for school development as well as learning material grants. Schools in
high-conflict zones also appear to have significantly fewer female teachers.
The variation in conflict from the SATP dataset is at the district level and the
15DISE data have been used for many studies on schooling (DISE website).
16Schools that include the study of Islam, though this may not be the only subject studied.
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number of schools in the sample is 86,558, each on average being repeated 5.9 times
(n = 514,614) in our main regression). However, we will carry out a conservative
check on our results by including block fixed effects – there are 149 blocks (smaller
administrative units) under the 22 districts. Finally, we include school fixed effects.
In all cases, we cluster our errors at the block level due to a small number of district
clusters. When running the school fixed specification, we cluster our standard errors
at the district level to obtain the most conservative estimates as the serial correlation
in the error terms for all schools within a district is allowed to vary. The results are
consistent when clustering at higher or lower levels. We run two sets of regressions.
In the first set, we find the first-order impact on the total boys and girls enrolled
in schools in Assam. This is done using the following empirical specification:
yijt = αt + βt + γ(Killedjt−1) + ijt (3.1)
where y ijt is total children, total boys enroled, total girls enrolled and girl’s
enrolment ratio (i.e. total girls/total children) i in district j in year t. αiand βtare
school and year fixed effects. Killedjt−1 is a measure of intensity of conflict in
district j in year t. For running the above regression, we merge the school-level time
varying data from DISE (available for 2005-14) with the conflict data collated from
SATP described above. As the first academic year begins in 2005 and ends in 2006,
we take district-level violence from 2005 as the “previous” year for the enrolment
that is reported in 2006 at the end of the academic year. Each school is “exposed”
to the conflict in its district in a year. The key innovation of the paper is to not
only control for district fixed effects, the level at which conflict takes place, but to
sequentially allow block fixed effects (149 blocks), and, finally, school fixed effects,
as 86,558 schools are observed on average 5.9 times over the 9 years of data. If we
did not control for block or school fixed effects, one could argue that attacks may
be taking place in blocks within districts that had “worse” schools, either because
of low human capital returns and the opportunity cost argument, or because of
omitted variables that were correlated with schools having poorer outcomes and
incidence of insurgent attacks. This would bias our estimates with the district fixed
effects specification. In particular, if the omitted variables (for example, quality of
public health services on the supply-side or parental education on the demand-side)
positively affected girl’s enrolment and were negatively correlated with the incidence
of violence, then there would be a downward bias on our estimates. In other words,
we would get a “bigger” negative coefficient on that would be biased and would
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show a much larger effect. Thus, controlling for block fixed effects should give a
lower estimate of the impact (in absolute value) than controlling at a higher level
(such as with district fixed effects).
We believe that this is the first paper in the literature to study variation in
enrolment patterns within schools in response to conflict at the district level.
The empirical specification for our next set of regressions is as follows:
yijt = αj + βt + γ(Killedjt−1) + δResit + ω(Resit ∗Killedjt−1) + ijt (3.2)
Here, Resik is an index of resources (number of computers, grants received,
number of teachers, toilets, etc.) available at the school-level. γ can be interpreted
as the impact of terrorism on girl’s enrolment for schools having a resource index
value equal to zero.
Overall, we would like to test the following hypotheses through regressions (1)
and (2):
(a) γ is negative, implying a deleterious effect of terrorism on enrolment for
girls after controlling for school and year fixed effects.
(b) The effect of conflict on girl’s enrolment could be heterogeneous by grade.
For example, if the opportunity cost of schooling is higher for higher classes (due
to possibility of engaging in labor), the higher classes should experience a greater
shortfall in enrolment in response to conflict. If, on the other hand, parents have
a reduction in their expectations of the marginal returns to education, they may
reduce education for their children in an earlier grade. This may happen if, for
example, there is a higher risk of younger girls being targeted during a time of high
conflict or if parents adopt a “wait and watch” policy for younger girls.
(c) δ and ω should be positive. ω refers to the marginal impact of terrorism on
girl’s enrolment for schools with higher resources and δ is the impact of resources on
enrolment in peaceful district-years. We would expect estimates of γ to be negative
and ω to be positive; thereby resources may work to cushion the negative gender-
differential effects of the insurgency.
(d) We would also like to test which resources are the most effective at cushioning
the effect of conflict on enrolment for girls.
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The results first document if conflict affects girls differently. Second, we propose
to test if there are heterogeneous effects by grade and, finally, we test for a cushioning
effect on the gender gap by interacting a school’s resources with conflict in the
district. This will help policy makers in deciding which resources are most effective
in curtailing the gender gap and fostering equal access to education during times of
conflict.
3.3 Results
Table 3.8.4 shows the first order effect of conflict on total children attending schools.
We show negative effects of conflict intensity on school enrolment where conflict in-
tensity is measured by the total number of individuals killed in an incident. However,
Table 3.8.5 shows that controlling for school fixed effects and year fixed effects, in-
tensity of conflict increases total children enroled in schools. The results with the
district fixed effects could have an omitted variable bias, where the omitted vari-
able is positively correlated with total enrolmentof kids in schools and is negatively
correlated with intensity of conflict, thereby resulting in large negative coefficients.
Table 3.8.6 and Table 3.8.7 show the results by total girls enrolled and total boys
enrolled in a school. There are two take-away messages from this table. First, the
coefficient on the variable “killed” is negative and significant for both boys and
girls across the different controls in specifications (1) to (4) and then (7) to (10).
The school fixed effects regression gives an insignificant (and positive) coefficient for
both boys and girls. This appears to suggest that school fixed effects absorb most
of the variation that explains total children enrolled while total killings has little
additional effect in explaining the total children enrolled over and above school fixed
effects. The other pattern we notice is that conflict’s effects on total girl’s enrol-
ment are more deleterious than on total boy’s enrolment across all specifications.
Table 3.8.7 also shows that there is not necessarily an increase in boy’s enrolment
rate in response to the girl’s decrease (that is, we find a lack of substitution effects).
In Table 3.8.8, we illustrate the main results of the impact of conflict on girl’s
enrolment in the schools for the classes provided in the data set (classes 1-8). From
our regression, we observe γ to be significantly negative for the effect of total killings
on girl’s enrolment ratios (total girls enrolled in school divided by total children
enroled in school) without district and year fixed effects (column 1). The coefficient
is equal to -0.0000480**.
Controlling for district and year fixed effects (in column 3), the main result is
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still significant at the 5% level but the girl’s enrolment rate drops to -0.0000351**.
However, our regression is high-powered because of the high number of observations.
Note that the standard errors are clustered at the block level (the level of aggregation
below a district) because we only have 22 districts in the sample, making clustering
unreliable if the number of clusters are less than 42 (Angrist and Pischke (2008)).
Results remain robust to clustering at the village level and/or adding block fixed
effects (149 dummy variables) instead of district fixed effects. With block fixed
effects (column 4), the estimate is -0.0000322** hinting at a small downward bias
in the regression with district fixed effects.
In the most conservative regression specification with year and school fixed ef-
fects, we observe significance at the 5 per cent level in column (5). The interpretation
for -0.0000339** observed can be thought of as follows. There are, on average, 90
children per school and 3,934 schools per district per year in our sample, and we
are ultimately interested in the costs of conflict (at the level of the district) on the
girl’s enrolment ratio at the district level. This implies that to get the estimate of
the number of female students who stop going to school in a district due to an extra
killing in that district, the coefficient can be multiplied by 90*3,934 (= 354,060).
For every additional killing in a district in a year (6.16 is the mean of annual
killings per district during 2005-14), we should see a decline in the district’s girl’s
enrolment by -0.0000339*354,060 which equals 12 girls who are missing in school.
For 6 killings per district (in an average year), 72 girls appear to drop out of school on
average in that district. Going from the 5th percentile to a 95th percentile conflict-
prone district increases killings from 0 to 21 in a year. This would imply a dropping
out of 252 girls. Thus, effects of additional killings in the district are large if girl’s
enrolment is calibrated at the district level rather than the school level. Another
way of thinking about the magnitude of the impact is to understand the impact on
girl’s enrolment rate at the school if the killings in a district double (increase by 100
per cent). This is done by running a regression of log of girl’s enrolment on log of
killed. As shown in Table 3.8.9, the impact is significant and about 13 per cent for
doubling of killings in a district-year (from 6 to 12 killings).
When the definition of conflict is expanded to include the number of injured
civilians in a district-year as well, we find less strong negative impacts of conflict
on girl’s enrolment (Table 3.8.21). This may mean that killings alone have more
predictive power for reducing school enrolment of girls.
There could be a concern that a fall in girl’s enrolment ratio in schools is reflective
of pre-existing gender imbalance in the population where more boys are born (or
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survive) relative to girls over time and it is not due to conflict per se. Using Census
data on child sex ratio, defined as number of females between the age of 0-6 years
per thousand males between the age of 0-6 years, from the Directorate of Economics
and Statistics, we find that child sex ratio has been on the rise in both low and high
conflict districts. Kokrajhar, a district that has had one of the highest number of
reported killings per year on average in the year 2000, has seen a rising trend in
child female population between 2001-2011. Highest decline in child sex ratio has
been reported in low conflict districts of Dhemaji and highest rising trend in child
female population has been reported in the low conflict district of Hailakandi.
The results are in line with Chamarbagwala and Mora´n (2011), Shemyakina
(2011), and Singh and Shemyakina (2016) as they had found a greater negative
impact on girl’s education from household surveys, but different from Swee et al.
(2009)and Kecmanovic (2013), who had uncovered a larger negative effect for boys.
In Table 3.8.10 and Table 3.8.11, we split the samples by different school manage-
ments. We find that our main results are driven by two types of school management
systems—local body and private unaided body. In both these cases, these schools
appear to be locally administered and relatively autonomous. The results also show
that schools, the majority of which are run by the Department of Education or So-
cial Welfare Department, or private aided schools, do not show a decrease in girl’s
enrolment rates in response to violence (coefficients are insignificant and positive).
Similarly, the coefficient on madrassas is insignificant (although negative). This may
mean that households that send girls to attend public schools are ”different” from
those that send girls to attend private unaided schools and are unlikely to change
schooling in response to conflict. On the other hand, it could also imply that public
schools are better at retaining girls during times of uncertainty.
In Table 3.8.12, we illustrate heterogeneous effects of conflict on girl’s enrolment
by class or grade that would (most likely) be taking place at the schools run by
local and private unaided bodies. Surprisingly, we find that the effects are not
driven by (older) girls in higher classes. They seem to be driven by girls enrolled
in classes 3 and 4. In fact, the enrolment ratio for older girls is positive, suggesting
that perhaps they have crossed the conflict trap either from the demand-side, by
allowing parents to send them for additional education, or from the supply-side, by
giving them more opportunities to study in higher secondary schools established by
the government. Although the eighth class is widely considered to be the critical
barrier during peaceful times, it may not necessarily be the margin to focus on when
studying the effects of conflict on girl’s enrolment.
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We also find that the significant results are driven by schools located in rural
areas in Table 3.8.13. This may be because the conflict was focused in rural areas,
but it could also be that most of the schools surveyed under DISE were in rural
areas, lowering the power for the urban area regressions. Nevertheless, the results
are in line with the effects on rural girl’s enrolment found in Singh and Shemyakina
(2016)
A large literature recognizes that lower incomes and poorer growth may be rea-
sons for both onset and persistence of conflict, leading to a conflict-poverty trap.
We check whether the responses to conflict for girl’s enrolment are greater for poorer
districts. This may be because the parents may be more affected by conflict and
may feel a greater need to either switch to only invest in boys (at the cost of girls)
or reduce the schooling expenditure for both boys and girls. Although we lack
individual-level data on family incomes, district per capita income in 2005 that is
available from the Directorate of Economics and Statistics in Assam is the next best
proxy available. By defining a dummy for high gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita to equal 1 for districts that are above the median income at baseline, we
find that poorer districts have on average a three times higher response to civilian
casualties than the richer districts, where effects are muted as shown in column (5)
of Table 3.8.15. The effect for richer districts can be found by adding the two coef-
ficients in the last regression. The stand-alone dummy for “High GDP” not present
in columns (3)–(5) because it gets absorbed by district fixed effects. However, we do
not find differential effects of Killed on enrolment by GDP growth rates, suggesting
that baseline economic indicators are more important for explaining heterogeneity
than the growth rates (which might also be endogenous to conflict).17
In Table 3.8.16, we delve into the mechanisms for “safety” of girls to isolate the
impact of economic deprivation from simply, security of girls in that district during
the insurgency. Here, we use data on the incidence of rapes against women from
2005, as provided by the Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi. We calculate the
median rapes per capita and again categorize districts as “High Rape” depending on
whether or not they had greater than the median level of rape incidence. If safety
was a pertinent issue, we might expect that the interaction between casualties and
insecurity of girls would lead to an even greater negative response on girl’s enrolment.
However, we do not find the interaction effect to be significant although it has the
sign we would expect (negative).
17Available upon request: The median GDP growth rate is 6 per cent per year for a district




Schools have been targeted in isolated incidents in 2013. From the SATP data, we
observe that on February 11, 2013, three schools were set ablaze in Goalpara district
on the eve of the local village elections (Panchayat elections). In a similar incident,
three schools in the rural Kamrup district were partially burnt down in the run-up
to the same set of elections. We test for the robustness of the results by running
our main specification (as in Table 4.1) for different sub-samples. We test for the
robustness of our main result in Table 3.8.17 by excluding:
(a) Hailakandi, Goalpara, and Kamrup as these were the districts that suffered
direct attacks on schools. The estimate remains significant and similar (the
estimate is -0.0000229**) with school fixed effects implying that these dis-
tricts were not driving the main results.
(b) The year 2013 from our analysis when such incidents took place in the run-
up to the local elections. The estimate remains significant and similar (the
estimate is -0.0000283**) in the most conservative regression (with school
fixed effects) suggesting that direct violence targeted at schools does not
drive our main results.
(c) International border districts of Cachar, Dhubri, Kokrajhar, and Karimganj,
as the violence surrounding border areas was usually carried out by different
rebel groups hiding in foreign countries and thus the dynamics of conflict
may be different from the rest of Assam. The estimate remains significant
and even higher in absolute value, the estimate is -0.0000552*** in the most
conservative regression hinting that border district violence does not drive
our main results.
In Table 3.8.18, we test for the impact of killed per capita in a district (dividing
killed by district population in 2005, available from the Directorate of Economics
and Statistics, Assam). The results remain consistent with this specification as well,
suggesting that both aggregate levels of violence and likelihood of getting affected
by violence are highly correlated. Results also remain robust to including per capita
income and population as additional controls.
Next, we check for lagged effects of conflict by taking number of civilians killed
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in that district in the calendar year before the onset of the academic year (2.5
years before the end of the academic year). Observing the coefficients presented in
Table 3.8.19, we find significant and negative effects on girl’s enrolment rate but the
size of the coefficient is smaller than that found in Table 3.8.8.
We were concerned that the conflict data may be biased as it is from collated news
reports on the SATP website. The Bureau of Investigation’s Special Branch under
the Ministry of Home Affairs in Assam shared with us their dataset on district-wise
bombings (and civilians, extremists, and security forces killed in those bombings)
by the main insurgent group ULFA in the state from 2005 to 2012. We use this data
to perform further checks on our results. In Table 3.8.20, we find consistent results
that bombings that caused civilian or extremist casualties were correlated with a
lower girl’s enrolment ratio within the most conservative specification.
Additionally, we wanted to check if results may have been driven by extensive dif-
ferential migration rates across conflict-prone districts and this may be related to
having a girl or a boy. However, due to a lack of individual data on migration, we
are unable to rigorously test this assumption. Nevertheless, we checked the Indian
Human Development Survey from 2012 for Assam and found that out of 4,598 house-
holds sampled from seven districts, only 53 households (1.1 per cent) had migrated
from another district in the last five years.
In Table 3.8.21 we redo the analysis using a different measure of conflict inten-
sity. Here, we use the total number of killings or injured as the measure of conflict
intensity and our findings are consistent with other measures of conflict.
Another way of measuring conflict is using the total number of violent incidents as
a measure of conflict intensity. Incidents of violence are costly to collect. Addition-
ally, the interpretation of the effect of the number of violent incidents on schooling
outcome is not clear. Militancy in Assam involves bombing in urban centers, kid-
nappings of businessmen and targeted murders of ethnic minorities such as Hindi
speaking Bihari migrants. Violent incidents that target rich business person or tea
garden managers may not affect the schooling decisions of middle income or lower
income households. Due to the lack of data on income, linguistic ethnicity of the
students in DISE data, we are unable to use a total number of incidents as a measure
of conflict on schooling outcomes.
Furthermore, we redo the analysis of girls enrolment rate using a balanced sample




Next, we elicit policy recommendations by checking for heterogeneities of responses
to violence by school resources. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.8.23 show that
even though grants to schools, such as teaching and learning grant, and school
development grant, are useful in increasing girl’s enrolment rate, they do not cushion
the effects of conflict. All the regressions control for district and year fixed effects
but results are robust to controlling for block fixed effects.
Computers and library books are neither strong predictors of girl’s enrolment in
peace nor in conflict (columns 3 and 4). What appears to matter most for improving
the gender balance is having more teachers per pupil who are professionally qualified
and recruiting more female teachers per pupil (columns 5 and 6). One additional
professionally qualified teacher increases girls enrolment ratio by .02 percentage
points. This is 377 times higher effect than that of conflict on girls enrolment ratio.
Similarly, an increase of one female teacher per pupil increases girl?s enrolment ratio
by .07 percentage points. This is about 1250 times more than the negative effects
of conflict on girl?s enrolment. This implies that policies should focus more on
incorporating more skilled human resources in schools and encourage more women
to become teachers. Policies that stress physical resources within schools are less
effective in combating the harmful effects of violence on women’s empowerment.
3.6 Conclusion
In her 2014 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, Malala Yousafzai said, “I tell
my story, not because it is unique, but because it is not. It is the story of many
girls”. This paper tells the story of many girls who are missing in schools because
of localized insurgencies. We find negative effects on school enrolment for girls and
these responses are greater for lower primary school girls studying in schools run
by local and unaided private bodies. Gender enrolment ratios in rural schools and
poorer districts seem to be particularly negatively affected by conflict. The effects
are robust to including district, block, or school fixed effects, along with year fixed
effects, and to a host of other robustness checks. There also does not appear to be
a corresponding increase in total boy’s enrolment.
The sprouting of several Assamese militant outfits representing local tribes (such
as Bodos) does not augur well for gender inequality in education. Recently, it was
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reported that “nine organizations representing the indigenous and tribal communi-
ties of Assam joined hands to form a political alternative for the coming Assembly
elections in Assam.” Hopefully, political concessions will lead to more peace in the
state that has suffered from loss of life and capabilities. On the other hand, the gov-
ernment’s policies to improve girl’s enrolment during violent times in Assam should
consider providing incentives for younger girls, and focusing efforts to build more
public schools and monitoring local body schools.
Moreover, although school grants are useful for improving gender balance during
peaceful times, policies that revolve around hiring female teachers and professionally
qualified teachers appear to have the greatest impact on improving girl’s enrolment.
Nevertheless, it is also important to understand the socio-psychological reasons that
lead some children away from school and these results, paired with finding demand-




Figure 3.7.1: District heat map of Assam with mean killed or injured.
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Figure 3.7.2: Total civilians killed in the Assam insurgency, by district (2000-15).
Source: Author’s compilation based on SATP data.
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Figure 3.7.3: Girl’s enrolment ratio using DISE surveys, by district (2005-14).
Source: Author’s compilation based on DISE data.
141
Figure 3.7.4: Ratio of female to male teachers using DISE surveys, by district (2005-
14). Source: Author’s compilation based on DISE data.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.8.1: Conflict in Assam 2000-2014 using SATP data
















Note: Means for every year are calculated per district in As-
sam. Killed or injured are total civilians killed or injured in
insurgency-related incidents. Source: Author’s compilation
based on SATP data.
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Table 3.8.2: Conflict in Assamese districts (2000) using SATP data


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.8.20: Alternative definition of Conflict
Dep var: Girl’s enrolment ratio (1) (2) (3)
Civilians killed -0.0000649***
(0.0000180)




Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes
School Fixed Effects yes yes yes
N 348186 348186 348186
adj. R-sq 0.002 0.002 0.002
Notes: Data on ULFA bombing was obtained from Bureau of Investigation Special
Branch, Department of Home Affairs, Assam. Civilians killed measures the civilians
killed in ULFA bombing incidents in Assam by district and year. Security forces killed
measures security forces killed in bombing incidents in Assam by district and year.
Extremists killed measures extremists killed in bombing incidents in Assam by district
and year. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 ∗p < 0.1. Source: Author’s compilation based























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1: Cross-state literacy gaps in 2001
GDI in 2001 Literacy gap in 2001 Literacy gap in 2011
A. Pradesh 0.48 20.33 14.12
Assam 0.49 8.64 11.54
Manipur 0.58 18.17 13.32
Meghalaya 0.51 5.73 3.39
Mizoram 0.67 4.56 4.32
Nagaland 0.42 9.19 6.60
Sikkim 0.59 15.60 10.86
Tripura 0.56 16.10 9.03
India 0.54 21.60 16.68
Source: Planning Commision (2001); www.indiastat.com
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Table A2: Cross State literacy in classes IX-XII
Class IX-X (14-15 years) Class XI-XII (16-17 years)
Boys Girls Gap Boys Girls Gap
Ar Pradesh 73.3 67.9 5.4 49.1 45.7 3.4
Assam 52.0 46.9 5.1 18.2 14.6 3.6
Manipur 83.5 80.1 3.4 39.0 32.1 6.9
Meghalaya 49.0 49.9 -0.9 13.7 17.3 -3.6
Mizoram 75.4 78.3 -2.9 41.2 40.2 1.0
Nagaland 27.4 29.5 -2.1 18.3 16.7 1.6
Sikkim 44.9 50.3 -5.4 27.6 29.5 -1.9
Tripura 73.0 73.3 -0.3 31.9 25.0 6.9
India 69.0 60.8 8.2 42.2 36.1 6.1
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